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TOWARD EFFECTIVE MUNICIPAL ZONING
ARVAL MORRIS*
New York City with its 33,000 inhabitants was this nation's largest
city when George Washington was inaugurated president.' Only a
small fraction more than three per cent of our total population lived in
cities numbering over 8,000 people,' and the total population of this
vast, virgin land was less than four million.2 In those halcyon days of
frontier philosophy, Thomas Jefferson proclaimed that Americans
would "settle the lands in spite of everybody."4 No truer prophecy has
been uttered by man.
Estimates vary, but if we assume that our normal population growth
will continue for the next four decades, the United States will probably
contain 320 million people, and its ten super-metropolitan areas will
have 107 million inhabitants-one-third of our nation's total.5 Urban-
ities will compose about eighty-five per cent of our national population
and this means not only more people, but more people concentrated
in a relatively limited number of metropolitan areas.6 For example, by
the year 2000, population growth will require an additional 55,000
square miles of land adjacent to metropolitan centers, and this need
equals the entire land area of the state of Illinois-two per cent of the
entire land area of the United States!7
The implications of such growth are staggering; one example will
suffice. Apart from towering implications for efficient land use and
transportation, the increased demand for water alone will surely pro-
duce a national crisis in water supply, previously available in abun-
* Associate Professor of Law.
II CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, Part 32-8, Table
4 (1950).
2 BARTLEY, MUNICIPAL ZONING: FLORIDA LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (1950).
3 1 MORRISON & COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 790 (1957).
The figure for 1790 was 3,929,214, and today, of course, New York City numbers twice
that figure.
4 Quoted from ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1776-1936,
91 (1942).
5 PICKARD, METROPOLITANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1959) ; see also HATT &
REISS, CITIES AND SOCIETY (1957), and HARLOW, THE GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES
(1943).
6 See Wirth, Urbanism As a Way of Life, in HATT & REISS, CITIES AND SOCIETY 46
(1957) ; "We have grown in the last decade by an amount nearly equal to our entire
population one hundred years ago." Schlesinger, The Big Issue, Progressive, Sept.,
1960, p. 9.
7 Assuming an overall average population density of new growth areas at 2,500 per-
sons per square mile. PICKARD, op. cit. supra note 5. See, Fordham, Decision-Making
In Expanding American Urban Life, 21 OHIO ST. L. J. 274 (1960).
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dance. The predicted available supply of fresh water for 1980, just
20 years away, is 515-billion gallons per day. In 1900 we consumed
41 billion gallons of fresh water per day, in 1945 we were up to 150
billion gallons, but by 1980, water resource authorities predict that
our fresh water needs will total more than 600 billion gallons per day!8
Simple arithmetic will show that daily demand will exceed the supply
by some 85 billion gallons2 Surely, outmoded carry-overs of frontier
philosophy, with their generated legalisms, must give way to the re-
quirements of this newly emerging world.10
Some people view these forecasts with alarm, others look upon them
as golden opportunities, but certainly two things are beyond dispute:
that "to be forwarned is to be forearmed," and that the legal adjust-
ments which must be made to accommodate such growth will necessi-
tate an informed and responsible legal leadership at all levels of na-
tional and community life. A rational approach is required. Planning
and developing our metropolitan communities has already begun, and
it is hoped that this article, which concentrates on one aspect of land-
use planning, on a legal technique for securing comprehensive com-
munity design, i.e., zoning, might contribute to the overall effort.11
Zoning is a legal device which complements comprehensive planning
by effectuating the plan, 2 and is the offspring of urgent urban neces-
sity. In its ordinance form, it constitutes an exercise of the police
power and consists primarily of classification. It envisions a division
of land into districts, subjecting the land in each district to different
8 Barnhill, National Crisis In Water Supply Coining, 2 CURRENT MUNICIApL PROB-
LEMS 107, 109 (1960).
9 One partial solution might lie in converting salt into fresh water; See Progress In
Salt Water Conversion Plants, 2 CURRENr MuNIcP. PROBLEMS 35 (1960).
10 Brief perusal of current water law doctrines will reveal their lack of comprehen-
sion of this problem and its magnitude. This is because they were frozen into shape by
the issues of another era, and by themselves, cannot be expected to mold a sound future.
See generally FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (1904); WIEL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES (3d ed. 1911), and Morris, Washington
Water Rights-A Sketch, 31 WASH. L. REV. 243 (1956).
11 Washington has not experienced a plethora of cases as have New Jersey, Florida
and California, perhaps because there exists so little planning and zoning, or the zoning
may be so excellent there is no need for litigation, or so poor no one has to fight to get
what he wishes. But, there is an increasing number of cases, so that the practitioner
imminently faces the likelihood of being confronted with a zoning problem.
12 It is not the exclusive technique. Besides private covenants, public ownership,
capital budgeting techniques, urban renewal and platting and subdivision laws, "Three
of the major'tools which are used to implement your planning program are: First, the
zoning ordinance; second, the building code; and, third, the power of eminent domain
through which such land as you need for parks and playgrounds, schools, hospitals, and
parking lots may be condemned and acquired." BLUCHER, COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS at 40 in BUREAU op'Gov. RES. AND SERVICES, U. OF W.,
PLANNING AS A SOLUTION TO STATE AND LOCAL PROBLEMS, Rep. No. 83, 34 (1948).
See also WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 265-312 (1958).
Is See State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 147 Atl. 294, 300 (1929).
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regulations concerning its use.'" Considerations of district boundaries
and use regulations are legislative in character, lying within the wisdom
of a city council.' 5 Zoning generally must reflect an appreciation of
the character of the land and its structures, its uniqueness for particu-
lar uses, plus regard for uniformity and equality within each use dis-
trict.' They are, of course, subject to judicial scrutiny to test whether
they genuinely promote the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare.'
THlE SCOPE OF THE ZONING PowER
The constitutionality of comprehensive zoning became fertilely
rooted in our jurisprudence after the United States Supreme Court, in
1926, decided a landmark case-Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.'" Although some notable state court decisions were early ground-
breakers, upholding comprehensive zoning,'" the Euclid decision
geysered through an otherwise inhospitable judicial attitude towards
progressive social and economic legislation."0 It settled once and for
all that zoning, in principle, was constitutional.2 '
During 1922, the Euclid village council adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance which divided the village land area into three over-
lapping categories, creating six separate use districts, three different
14 Toulouse v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 87 A.2d 670 (1952);
Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 NJ.L. 145, 198 AtI. 225 (1938).
15 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (2d ed. 1953) ; 1 RATHKOPF, TEE LAW
OF ZONING AND PLANNING 12-1, 16 (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Yokley and
Rathkopf respectively].
16 Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 (1957) ; Northwest
Merchants Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743 (1948).
17 E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
18 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The vote was 6 to 3.
19 City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925) ; Miller v. Board of
Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925) ; State ex rel. Civello v. City of New
Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923). But contra were, Goldman v. Crowther, 147
Md. 282, 128 AtI. 50 (1925) ; Ignaciunas v. Risley, 98 N.J.L. 712, 121 At. 783 (1923);
and Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
20 But cf. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) ; and Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
21 One commentator, Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on Municipal
Discretion in Zoning Legislation, 16 VA. L. Rxv. 689, 699 (1930), heralds the foresight
and liberalism in the Court's tolerant attitude, but another, more recent, observer,
Miner, Some Constitutional Aspects of Housing Legislation, 39 ILL. L. Rav. 305 at 311
(1945), criticizes Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion for having related the zoning power
too strictly to health and safety considerations thereby excluding zoning's "stabilizing
effect on land values, of the beautification of a city through the orderly development of
improvements and of aesthetic satisfaction in its bearing upon human well-being....'
However, the Washington court has indicated that "the aesthetic taste is not to be
frowned on nor classed as prejudice," State ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
144 Wash. 74, 80, 256 Pac. 781 783, rev'd on other grounds, 278 U.S. 116 (1927). It
early indicated that zoning which seeks to maintain property values is proper. See
Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 Pac. 1067 (1910).
[VoL. 35
MUNICIPAL ZONING
heights districts, and four distinct axea districts. Ambler Realty Com-
pany, party plaintiff, owned 68 acres of land which, in the course of
its natural development, was destined for industrial purposes and car-
ried a market value of $10,000 per acre. However, the zoning ordinance
classified' some of the plaintiff's land exclusively for residential pur-
poses, thereby dropping its market value to $2,500 per acre. The realty
company sought to enjoin the ordinance as depriving it of property
without due process of law and as denying it equal protection of the
laws, derogating from the protections afforded by the 14th amendment
because, allegedly, the measure diminished the prospective use of land.
Although the case was couched in terms of an individual .property
owner, more was at stake than the various values on the 68 acres.
Ambler Realty Company "represented a larger group seeking to de-
stroy the zoning movement, and.., the Euclid ordinance was chosen
for this purpose because of certain weaknesses which were felt to in-
here in its provisions."22
The lower court ruled on the issues generally, and enjoined the com-
prehensive zoning plan in its entirety as a confiscation and general
restraint on land. Consequently, when reviewing the matter, the Su-
preme Court passed only on the principle of zoning broadly and gen-
erally, questioning whether the plan was rooted in reasonableness and
whether it bore a substantial relation to the public health, safety, mor-
als or general welfare which might justify an exercise of the police
power. The crux .of the matter was the constitutional propriety of the
police power restriction on plaintiff's land uses to residential purposes
only and allowing others to enjoy both residential and industrial uses.28
Noting that this decision involved the police power and thereby re-
quired a consideration of the ordinance "in connection with the circum-
stances and the locality"2 plus passing on whether the ordinance had
assumed the character of arbitrary flat,2" the Court concluded that it
could not declare the ordinance so clearly arbitrary or unreasonable
as to have no substantial relation to proper police power purposes, and
upheld it.2" Thus, the Euclid case "has set at rest the question of the-
right of cities to enact such legislation,"2 and despite diminution in
22 Bettman, The Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Euclid
Village Zoning Case, 1 U. CINc. L. REv. 184 (1927).
28 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
24 Id. at 388.
25 Id. at 389.
26Id. at 390-395.27 State ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 144 Wash. 74, 77, 256 Pac. 781,
782 (1927), rezld on other grounds, 278,U.S. 116 (1928).
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land values due to zoning,25"... the right to establish zoning districts
is not an open question." 9
Since the remedy sought in Euclid was a generalized injunction
against the ordinance in its entirety, only the constitutional right to
zone was decided. The Court reserved its judgment on the constitution-
ality of individual sections of various zoning provisions and also on
their applications to specific lands.3" The latter situation soon came
before the Court and is clearly illustrated by Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge."' The Court found that, as applied, a specific zoning provision
which included part of a singly-owned tract of land within a residential
district, did not bear a reasonable relation to the promotion of health,
safety, and welfare of the commonwealth. 2 A small zone of land was
in question and had been zoned "residential," evidently as protection
for the well-established residential character of nearby lands. But the
Court could see no reason why the boundary between "residential"
and "industrial" zones should not be moved the 100 feet necessary to
accommodate plaintiff, eliminating the safety margin. The Court re-
fused to base its decision on the finding of a master, appointed by the
trial court, that "no practical use can be made of the land in question
for residential purposes," or on its own independent finding that zon-
ing a portion of a solely-owned tract as "residential" was "not indis-
pensable to the general plan" as revealed by its independent inspection
of the plat." Instead, the court said that the master's finding sup-
ported "by other findings of fact, is determinative of the case."34 Hence,
to the Court's mind, this provision, as applied, was found not to pro-
mote traditional police power purposes.
28 In a case in which diminution of value was the sole question, the Court held that
fact alone did not deny constitutionality to an ordinance which otherwise was not
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable." Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328
(1927). In Shepard v. City of Seattle, supra note 21, at 373, 109 Pac. at 1070, the
Washington court upheld an ordinance disallowing a private mental hospital in a resi-
dential zone because "the presence of such an institution... would practically destroy
the value of all property within its immediate vicinity ......
29 State ex rel. Hardy v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 244, 247, 284 Pac. 93, 94 (1930).
See also State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952) ; State ex rel.
Lane v. Fleming, 129 Wash. 646, 225 Pac. 647 (1924); and Hauser v. Arness, 44
Wn.2d 358, 267 P.2d 691 (1954).
30 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 18, at 395.
31277 U.S. 183 (1928). See also Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish
Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (1927), cert. denied 275 U.S. 569 (1927).
32 Plaintiff's procedural technique was a plea for a mandatory injunction directing
the city and its building inspector to pass on a building permit application without
regard for the ordinance if the building would otherwise be lawful. See, discussion infra
at notes 139-150.
33 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, supra note 31 at 188. "Nevertheless, if that were





This is hardly an adequate disposition of the case. In the first place,
the Euclid decision contained an express statement that had a reason-
able margin of land been included to insure effective zoning enforce-
ment it would not invalidate a zoning provision.8" Indeed, the court in
Nectow refused to base its decision solely on the master's findings
which had faced the issue squarely; instead, it indicated that "other
findings of fact" were required. But the Court's opinion fails to reveal
the nature and scope of the Court's inquiry or the character of other.
facts found, except for its general reference that the general plan would
not be subverted if this land were not classed "residential." The reason-
ing which possibly might explain the how and the why lying behind this
thinking remains a mystery, for clearly articulated explication had
escaped the Court. Consequently, we must conclude that the Court in
Nectow failed. to indulge the Euclid dictum, and also failed to give
deference to the legislature's judgment. In fact, it probably held the
Nectow ordinance to some unknown constitutional standard which was
higher than Euclid's requirement that, before the ordinance could be
set aside, it must be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare." 8 In the second place, Nectow is really not much use for future
prediction because we are left with the proposition that individual
zoning classifications, as applied, must promote the "health, safety,
convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the
city affected ... This vague generalization is not a very helpful
guideline.
More important,, however, is the consideration that most zoning
boundary lines, considered in isolation of the total plan but solely in
relation to the police power, can hardly be expected to locate the clear
and persuasive measure by which they, individually, promote some
particular police power purpose. Recognizing the importance of this
consideration, the Washington court has said that "if courts were to
consider each individual lot separate and apart from every other lot in
a particular use district, and try to determine whether any given struc-
ture erected or to be erected on it is dangerous or inimical to the public
health, safety, morals or welfare, there could be no successful zon-
ing." 8 "The public welfare must be considered from the standpoint
85 "The inclusion of a reasonable margin, to insure effective enforcement, will not
put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity." Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-9 (1926).36 Id. at 395.
87 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, supra note 31 at 188.
8 State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, mepra note 29 at 223.
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of the objective of the zoning ordinance and of all the property within
any particular use district." 9 Perhaps, as suggested, the real gist of
the Nectow opinion lies in its deliberate vagueness and was intended by
the Supreme Court only to be a cautionary measure, instructing state
courts to be wary of abusive applications of the zoning power."
If this is so, another admonition came from the Court a year later.
Where Nectow illustrates a succesful constitutional attack on a zoning
ordinance as applied, State ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge"
depicts a successful attack predicated on the face of a specific provision
itself. Seattle passed a zoning ordinance setting up a "First Residence
District" restricting this zoned land area to single family dwellings,
but admitting philanthropic homes for children or old people "when
the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-
thirds of the property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed
building."42 Like Euclid and Nectow, this provision was attacked
under the 14th amendment's "due process" and "equal protection"
clauses. The Court struck down Seattle's ordinance holding that the
delegation of power to surrounding land owners was arbitrary and
"repugnant to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."',
Again, the Court was impressed by the fact that exclusion of philan-
thropic homes was "not indispensable to the general zoning plan," but
more important was the Court's view that the ordinance itself plainly
implied that a philanthropic home would be consistent with the general
welfare, but only if the adjacent property owners were to consent.
The Court viewed the case as one which illustrated a delegation of
power subjecting a nonconsenting land owner to the whim and caprice
of his neighbors without standards and without the possibility of judi-
cial review. Irrespective of its application, the Court thought the ordi-
nance an unjustifiable restraint on a person's land use, bearing no
substantial relation to traditional police power objectives."
39 Ibid.
40 Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW & CONTE-mP. PROB.
199, 206 (1955).
41144 Wash. 74, 256 Pac. 781 (1927). Rev'd in 278 U.S. 116 (1928), see Annot., 86
A.L.R. 659-703 (1933).
42278 U.S. 116, 118 (1928). For the current approach of the Washington court to
a similar problem compare Chief Petroleum Corp. v. City of Walla Walla, 10 Wn.2d
297, 116 P.2d 560 (1941), with State ex rel. Lane v. Fleming, 129 Wash. 646, 225
Pac. 647 (1924).
43 Id. at 122.
44An analogous example is Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912),
striking a permissive ordinance which authorized two-thirds of the land owners abut-
ting on a street to impose building restrictions upon the remaining land in a block.
The converse situation was presented in Cusack v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526(1917).
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These landmark cases delimit the constitutional considerations of
zoning in a general way. 5 Constitutional issues may still arise in pecul-
iar cases, but there can be no doubt that so long as the zoning ordi-
nance is wisely drawn, including protective standards, and showing a
substantial and reasonable relation to the promotion or protection of
the traditional police power purposes, the Court will indulge presump-
tions to immunize it from constitutional attack."8 Constitutionally,
considered then, zoning is unquestionably a proper exercise of the
police power. But, what of police power?
Although the police power "is the most essential of powers, at times
the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers
of government,"" it is also one of the most vague and ill defined .4
Usually the "reasonable relationship" formula, requiring a reasonable
relationship between the power's exercise and the objective sought, is
merely a means of asking a question rather than being a dispassionate,
objective answer. Moreover, the question's answer, more often than
not, indicates that the court feels that the legislation under review,
e.g., zoning, doesn't go too far in the Court's collective mind as the
Court seeks to maintain its own notions of a fair balance between pub-
lic and private interests." Necessarily in these cases, the Court must
(1916), and the Court upheld an ordinance unqualifiedly prohibiting billboards in resi-
dential areas unless a majority of the lot owners authorized them. The Court reasoned
that the latter case allowed landowners to remove a land restriction; whereas, Eubank
authorized them to impose one. In Roberge, the Court distinguished Cusack charac-
terizing Roberge's proposed philanthropic home as not being a nuisance, but billboards
"by reason of their nature are liable to be offensive." State of Washington v. Roberge,
272 U.S. 116, 122 (1928). This last point has been called a "distinction without a
difference" by Ernst Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of
City Planning and Zoning, 24 ILL. L. Rav. 135, 143 (1929). The Court did not wrestle
with the really interesting problem: Is it possible to reconcile majority rule, e.g.,
Cusack, with "due process" considerations when the latter operate to pre-empt areas
from majority control?
45 "It should be noted, however, that certainly not all conceivable constitutional prob-
lems had been solved." Savage, Land Planning and Democratic Purposes, 34 No=an
DAmE LAW. 65, 66 (1958), and for an introduction to the subtle ways in which judges
can pave the way for legislative reforms which otherwise might be unconstitutional, see
Cross, The Interplay Between Property Law Change and Constitutional Barriers to
Property Law Reform (to be pub. in November issue of N.Y.U.L. Rev)4 
"Every possible presumptio n favor of the validity of a statute, and this con-
tinues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt." The Sinking Fund Cases,99 U.S. 700, 718 (1897), see Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality, 31 COLUM.
L. Ry. 1136 (1931), and Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered, 36
COLU . y. 283 (1936).
4 t Dis rict of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909).
48 Dickenson, "Defect of Power" In Constitutional Law, 9 TEMP. L. Q. 388 (1935);
Briggs, States Rights, 10 IowA L. REv. 297 (1925). It is highly unlikely that clear,
empirical referents will be found which distinctly separate "police power" from "emi-
nent domain." See Freund, supra note 44 at 136, and WILLIAmS, THE LAw OF CITY
PLANNING AND ZONING 25 (1922). Compare, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) with Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
49 Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HIAv. L. Rxv. 834, 836 (1924).
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make policy decisions, passing, in part, on the wisdom of the legislative
judgment in relation to the goals which the Court wishes to maximize-5"
However evasive and ubiquitous it is, we do know that municipalities
have no constitutionally protected right to the police power. Consti-
tutionally viewed, they are agencies of the states, and the Supreme
Court has decided that they cannot invoke the "due process" clause5
or the "equal protection" clause52 against their sovereigns. In Williams
v. Baltimore,5" Mr. Justice Cardozo declared that a municipal corpor-
ation had "no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution
which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator."5 Conse-
quently, a Washington city probably has neither the right "to insist
that buildings constructed by the state be governed by the city building
code"55 nor that they be repaired in compliance with municipal ordi-
nances." But whenever they lie within municipal boundaries cities
of the first class probably can zone state-owned and platted tide lands
which are held in the state's "proprietary" capacity, 7 and lesser gov-
ernmental entities, such as a school district, probably must comply
with reasonable municipal building ordinances.5
5 0 This is not necessarily to be deplored even from the standpoint of a thorough-
going believer in democracy. See BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Ros-
tow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw., 573 (1958) ;
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1952),
but cf. Cohen, Is Judicial Review Necessary? BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 202 (Bishop & Hendel ed. 1951).
51 "A municipality is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold,
grant, or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. However great or small its
sphere of action, it remains the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and
privileges subject to the sovereign will." City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182,
187, (1923).
52 City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923). Nor does power once dele-
gated to a municipality via its statutory charter and later withdrawn impair the obli-
gation of contracts under art. I, § 10 of the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. See
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
53 289 U.S. 36 (1933). The Washington court has said that, "A municipal corpora-
tion is a body politic established by law as an agency of the state-partly to assist in
the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local
and internal affairs of the incorporated city, town, or district. Columbia Irr. Dist.
Co. v. Benton County, 149 Wash. 234, 235, 270 Pac. 813, 814 (1928). It has neither
existence nor power apart from its creator, the legislature, except such rights as may
be granted to municipal corporations by the state constitution." Lauterbach v. City of
Centralia, 49 Wn.2d 550, 554, 304 P.2d 656, 659 (1956) ; see generally Annotation, 116
A.L.R. 1037.
54 Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933). For contours of an
approach intimating that a municipality might insulate itself from state action, see,
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958), and Note, 33 WASH.
L. REv. 117 (1958). See also Ylvisaker, Some Criteria For a 'Proper' Area Division
of Government Powers, in AREA AND POWER 27 (Mass. ed., 1959).55 47 WASH. ATT'y GEN. OP. 17 (1947).
56 14 WASH. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 199 (1913).
5746 WASH. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 511 (1946).
58 50 WASH. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 80 (1950) ; see Shields v. Spokane School Dist. 81,
31 Wn.2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948).
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But some few state courts have decided matters differently. Their
opinions indicate that local government units possess a historically
rooted, separate right to exercise police power. Supposedly, this right
inheres in the very nature of a municipality itself.5" The great weight
of authority is against the inherent right doctrine,"0 and militates
against any inherent limitation on the power of a state legislature to
deal with the perplexing explosions of urban life which create today's
staggering community problems. These gigantic issues usually tran-
scend specific municipal boundaries and cannot be dealt with ade-
quately by an authority, like local units, whose jurisdiction is less
broad than is the scope of the problem. Today, the legal significance
of the inherent home rule doctrine is anachronistic at best,6 if for no
other reason than that most states, like Washington,"2 have adopted
express constitutional home rule provisions." Consequently, questions
concerning the scope, extent and propriety of a municipality's exercise
of the police power will not be governed so much by its inherent right
to do so as by considerations of whether the power was delegated for
the purpose used.6,
The delegation can come from either of two sources: the state con-
stitution or statute.6 5 State constitutional provisions are generally re-
ferred to with catch-phrase appeal as "home rule" provisions, often
sloganeering an analytical mind off its guard. These constitutional pro-
visions which usually empower localities to frame and adopt charters,"
59 State ex rel. Kern v. Arnold, 100 Mont. 346, 49 P.2d 976 (1935), but cf. Helena
Housing Authority v. City of Helena, 108 Mont. 347, 90 P.2d 514 (1939). See also
Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902) and State v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89
N.W. 204 (1902). Apparently the idea was first put forward by Cooley, J., in People
v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103 (1871). The inherent right theory has been
warmly embraced by Eaton, The Origin of Municipal Incorporation in England and
the United States, 25 RvE. Am. BAR Ass'N 292 (1902) and McQuillan, Constitutional
Right of Local Self-Government of Municipalities, 35 AM. L. REv. 510 (1901), but,
equally vigorously rejected in McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local
Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 299 (1916).
60 See Redell v. Moorer, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N.W. 243 (1901). The United States
Supreme Court has not passed on the matter.61 But cf. MorT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIEs (1949) ; however compare,
Walker, Let Cities Manage Themselves, 36 NAT'L MUN. REV. 625 (1946).6 2 WASH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 10. The inherent right doctrine has been rejected by
the Washington court. See State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 526-527, 118
Pac. 639, 640 (1911), ignoring its prior approval by citation and dictum, in City of
Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 398, 25 Pac. 337, 343 (1890).63 See ADRIAN, GOVERNING URRAN AMERICA 152-162 (1955).
64 1 YOKLEY 24. See generally Trautman, Administrative Law Problems of Dele-
gation and Implementation in Washington, 33 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1958).
65 A state's power to zone has been construed as being inherently derived from its
power to create a municipality. Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange,
120 N.J.L. 145, 198 AtI. 225 (1938).66See WASH. CoNsv. art XI, § 10.
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fall into two general classes: First, there are those that specifically set
forth the procedures to be followed for framing charters,67 and second,
there are others which grant the right to frame a charter but rely upon
the legislature to provide the machinery for an exercise of that right.6 8
The catching appeal of "home rule" has produced a spate of state
constitutional amendments, and local self-government provisions can
be found in twenty-four state constitutions. 6
The Washington constitution contains at least two provisions rele-
vant to any discussion of a municipality's possession and exercise of
the police power. One-the "home rule" provision-applies to cities
over 20,000 and enables these localities to frame their own charters."0
The other section contains a general grant of the police power to "any
county, city, town, or township," enabling these named units to frame
all ordinances which "are not in conflict with the general laws."'"
The home rule provision was early construed as falling within the
second general type of constitutional provisions set out above, provid-
ing only the right, and not the machinery, for exercising the right to
self-government." Since this provision is not self-executing," reliance
is thereby placed on the Washington legislature to provide machinery
to make this right effective. In fact, by making predominant a qualifi-
cation that city charters framed under this provision are "controlled
by general laws," the Washington court has effectively nullified any
separate grant of power and has insured the supremacy of the State
legislature. This controlling interpretation pretty much restricts the
section to one which grants qualified Washington cities the right to
choose their form of local government, but vests no additional powers.
The result is a notion that a "charter framed under the constitutional
provision is of no more or larger force than a legislative charter, and
can lawfully treat only of matters relating to the internal management
67 E.g., OnIo CONST. art. XVIII, but for its emasculation see State v. Krause, 130
Ohio 455, 200 N.E. 512 (1936), and Lowrie, Interpretation of the County Home Rule
Amendment by the Ohio Supreme Court, 10 U. CINc. L. REv. 454 (1936).68E.g., MICH. CONsT. art. VIII and W. VA. CoNST. art. VI, § 39(a).
69 Collected in 1 ANTIEU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW 95-96 (1955) and see
discussion of "home rule" at pp. 95-164.
70 WASH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 10.
71 WASH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11.
72 See In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac. 1064 (1891) ; State ex rel. Snell v.
Warner, 4 Wash. 773, 31 Pac. 25 (1892) ; State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court,
14 Wash. 604, 45 Pac. 23 (1896); Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash. 17, 42 Pac. 625(1895) ; Ewing v. City of Seattle, 55 Wash. 229, 104 Pac. 259 (1909) ; and Oakwood
Co. v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 22 Wn.2d 692, 157 P.2d 595 (1945).
73 "Nor do we think the contention that the constitutional provision is self-execut-
ing, and that legislative interference is unauthorized can be upheld." Reeves v. Ander-
son, supra note 72, at 23, 42 Pac. at 629.
[VOL. 35
MUNICIPAL ZONING
and control of municipal affairs.. .2.4 This means then, that this
provision will not sustain an attempt to create local tribunals to decide
contested election cases where a state statute has so provided,"5 neither
will it sustain an attempt to extend municipal boundaries by the cre-
ation of a new charter contra to state annexation procedures,76 nor
will it empower the use of eminent domain power without a separate
statutory grant."'
Although it is unquestionably true that "in practice as well as in
law home rule in Washington has been and is more largely a matter of
legislative grace than of constitutional right,"7 this is not necessarily
to be deplored.7 Indeed, one penetrating analyst has pointed out that
the home rule movement is in discordant dislocation with modern ideas
on public administration 'which stress flexibility and adaptability in
governmental affairs at the cost of fixed geographical patterns." Wash-
ington's present doctrinal position is farsighted and means that its
home rule provision does not amount to an inhibiting constitutional
grant of power to municipalities which, when properly exercised on
purely local matters, would pre-empt conflicting state statutes.8" Were
the alternative construction followed, the Washington legislature would
have been paralyzed in its attempt to deal with our mounting urban-
city problems which cut across municipal borders. The result would
have been an ineffective, satellitized approach to problems transcend-
ing the boundaries of any given community, but had not, as yet,
reached "state-wide" proportions. In addition, by eliminating the pre-
emption issue, the Washington courts are not called upon to indulge
the fiction which allocates and reallocates governing power under the
74I;re Cloherty, supra note 72, at 140, 27 Bac. at 1065.7 5 State ex r-el. Fawcett v. Superior Court, supra. note 72.76State ex r-el. Snell v. Warner, supra note 72;
77 City of Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 29 Pac. 848 (1892).7 8 McBMN, THE LAW AmD PRAcTicE OF Homm RuLE 455 (1916).
79 But cf. Comment, Homne Rule it; Washington-at the Whims of the Legislature,
29 WASH. L. REv. 295 (1954).
80 Fordham, The West Virginia Mmicipal Home Rile Proposal, 38 W. VA. L. Q.
235, 237-38 (1932) ; Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice,
9 OHIO ST. L. J. 18 (1948). But cf. Mendelson, Paths to Constitutional Home Rde
for Municipalities, 6 VANn. L. Rv. 66 (1952), and Walker, Toward a New Theory
of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nv. U.L. Rv. 571 (1955). Qutaere, Is "home-rule" com-patible with the realities of modern MVetropolitanism? .
SAnde~rson v. City of Two Harbors, 244 Minn. 496, 70 N.W.2d 414 ) 1955) ; Wiley
v. Berkeley, 136 Cal. App.2d 10, 288 P.2d 123 (1955); and State v. Carran, 133 Ohio
'50, 11 N.E.2d 245 (1937). However, where municipalities are wholly controlled by
state legislatures, a statute aways prevails over an ordinance. Hemphill v. Wabash
R.R., 209 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1954) cert. denied, 347 U.S. 954 (1954) and State ex rel.
Webster v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861 (1912).
1960]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
"purely local" versus "state-wide concern" formula." The point is
that, in Washington, the conduct of local governmental affairs is freed,
in this specific regard, from the additional time consuming and ex-
pensive process of submitting prospective municipal measures to judi-
cial scrutiny by means of friendly test suits for the purpose of determ-
ining whether the measures should have been enacted by a city council
or the state legislature. The attendant gain in effectiveness of Wash-
ington's democratic processes portends obvious implications for mean-
ingful zoning."
By contrast with Washington's "home rule" provision, our other
constitutional provision84 grants municipalities the police power, and
interestingly enough, its construction has been contrary to the home
rule provision. It is self executing.85 This direct delegation of the
police power to municipalities is as ample within its limits as that
possessed by the state legislature itself. 6 The constitutional provision
vests the police power in the named localities whether the governmental
unit has framed its own charter87 or not.88 Consequently, municipali-
82 Pre-emption doctrine is tvo-edged. Ordinances relating to "purely local affairs"
pre-empt conflicting state statutes, but a state statute on a matter "really" of "state-
wide concern" pre-empts the local ordinance, if in conflict. See Comment, Conflicts
Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1959).
83 It should be obvious that the extent to which a state legislature's representation is
apportioned, or gerrymandered, to represent acreage and not people, then there can be
no assurance our mounting metro-urban problems will be met. See Darrer and Kelsay,
Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT'L MuN. REV. 571 (1955). Obstacles to reapportion-
ment are huge, and besides an understandable lack of enthusiasm from rural areas, one
study reveals a special interest bloc between rural powers and such groups as chambers
of commerce, farm bureaus, motor truck ass'ns, teachers' ass'ns, and county and town
officials' ass'n. Bureau of Gov. Res., Ind. U., Apportionment and Reapportionment in
Indiana: Political Implications 3 (1947). In California, "Certain business interests in
the state have found it easier to make their influence felt in the legislature through
senators from rural areas." McHenry, Urban v. Rural in California, 35 NAT'L MUN.
REV. 353 (1946). Reapportionment of rotten boroughs is patently imperative for "legis-
latures must meet the needs of all inhabitants, not just the cornfields." Baker, RURAL
VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER 14 (1952), and the United States Supreme Court has
refused to do the job, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). The fear of urban
domination stymies realistic reapportionment; perhaps, Illinois' cumulative voting sys-
tem could effect a compromise. See Blair, Patterns of Party Allegiance, 52 Ams. POL.
Sci. REV. 123 (1958). But, probably reapportionment must come from the people, by
initiative. Yet, where legislatures have power to amend successful reapportionment
initiatives no genuine changes can be expected. See, e.g., State ex rel. O'Connell v.
Meyers, 51 Wn.2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957), and Note, 34 WASH. L. REV. 150 (1959).84 WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
85 "... for whatever authority the city has in respect of its police power, it has by
virtue of art. XI, § 11, of our constitution, independent of any statutory grant." Patton
v. City of Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 570, 38 P.2d 364, 365 (1934); Detamore v.
Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 145 Pac. 462 (1915).
86 City of Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 293, 48 P.2d 238 (1935); Linsler v. Booth
Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 Pac. 976 (1922).
87 See City of Spokane v. Coon, 3 Wn.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36 (1940) Brennan v. City
of Seattle, 151 Wash. 665, 276 Pac. 886 (1929) ; Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash.
363, 109 Pac. 1067 (1910).
88 Continental Baking Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 182 Wash. 68, 44 P.2d 821 (1935).
[VOL. 35
MUNICIPAL ZONING
ties need not always await enabling legislation before acting on local
problems; however, should a statute be subsequently passed, any ordi-
nance, if in conflict,9 must give way to the general law.9" Again, by a
construction which relies on the supremacy of "general law," the Wash-
ington court has avoided rigid complexity in local affairs as well as
the pre-emption issue, and has insured flexibility in local government
administration at the expense of local vested interests.
Court construction of this section has not enjoyed a consistent his-
tory, however, and confusion was injected when the court dealt with
questions of extraterritoriality. Recent rapid expansion of cities has
transformed conceptions of land-use planning and zoning from their
exclusive intra-city applications to ideas which require planning the
surrounding, undeveloped area lying on a municipality's fringe.91
Statutes quite commonly authorize cities not only to acquire and oper-
ate municipal property outside of the city limits for such local pur-
poses, inter alia, as water supply, sewage and garbage dumps,92 but also
confer planning and zoning powers over fringe areas from three to five
miles beyond the city's borders." This approach, though effective,
quite obviously gives rise to serious jurisdictional disputes between
cities and rural residents who dislike city-imposed restrictions on land
use;9" between competing cities seeking to exercise their extraterri-
torial powers over the same agricultural land;9 5 and between two cities
with a common boundary line but having differing ideas about the way
in which its adjacent lands should be developed." These problems
80 Washington court discussions of "conflict" are sparse. But municipalities con-
currently may legislate with the state on a subject matter enlarging on a statute and
no "conflict" will result, unless the statute operates as a "limitation" in which case the
ordinance must give way. See State ex rel. Isham v. City of Spokane, 2 Wn.2d 392,
98 P.2d 306 (1940) ; City of Seattle'v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 299, 48 P.2d 241 (1935),
compare Miller v. City of Spokane, 35 Wn.2d 113, 211 P.2d 165 (1949) appeal dismissed
339 U.S. 907 (1949).
90 City of Seattle v. Ross, 54 Wn.2d 655, 344 P.2d 216 (1959) ; Lauterbach v. City
of Centralia, 49 Wn.2d 550, 304 P.2d 656 (1956).
91 See generally Bartelt, Extraterritorial Zoning, 32 NonZE DAMELAW. 367 (1957) ;
Bowsma, Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning, 8 VAND. L. REV. 806 (1955) ;
Hemingway, Extraterritorial Powers of a Municipality, 24 Ky. L. J. 107 (1936), and
Anderson, Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINN. L. Rv. 475 (1926).9? If no express authority exists, courts have not hesitated to imply it. Austin v.
Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d 25 (1952) ; Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132
N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945) ; Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d
190 (1940), and 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 99.
03 See Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1182; Hannah, Legal Devices for Controlling the Use of
Farmland. 38 VA. L. Rzy. 451 (1952), and Note, 41 H~Av. L. Rav. 894 (1928).94 HoRAcK & NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS 99-106 (1955).
05 "A typical case is Lake County, Indiana, where fourteen cities. (including Gary,
Hammond, East Chicago) each contest for authority over adjacent rural areas and the
rural residents seek to prevent all urban control." Id. at 58, n. 25.90 Cresskill v. Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (1953). Perhaps regional
commissions are a partial answer, see RCW 35.63.070, but in Washington they rest on
the willing cooperation of all units involved.
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probably will not arise in Washington because it is highly unlikely that
attempts will be made to grant cities extraterritorial powers to zone.
The outstanding case is Brown v. City of Cle Elum.97
Cle Elum, then a city of the third class, obtained its water supply
from Lake Cle Elum, located about six miles northwest of the city
limits, and upon which there had been considerable swimming, fishing
and boating. Seeking to protect its inhabitants from polluted water,
the city passed an ordinance prohibiting all contamination of lake
waters under pain of fine or imprisonment." The measure was ex-
pressily authorized by a statute which allowed an extraterritorial exer-
cise of the police power."' For the first time, and then on re-hearing,
the court passed on "whether or not the legislature can constitutionally
delegate to a city authority to exercise police power beyond its terri-
torial limits and outside the boundaries of property it may own beyond
its territorial limits by the passing and enforcing of ordinances assum-
ing to regulate the conduct of citizens beyond such limits and boun-
daries. 1 . In a cryptic, two-page per curiam opinion, the court
answered in the negative.
The city sought to uphold its ordinance by arguing that it was ex-
pressly authorized by statute; however, the court felt that "those sec-
tions of the code have no validity, however, in view of the constitutional
provision, art. XI, sec. 11... . "" This provision which expressly grants
police power to municipalities was construed to operate as a limitation
on subsequent delegations of power to cities by the legislature.0 2 This
view imparts reasoning which necessitates the premise that not only
must constitutionally granted power be exercised exclusively within a
city's limits, but also, so must legislatively granted powers, and at-
tempts to delegate extraterritorial powers probably would be void. If
97 145 Wash. 588, 261 Pac. 112 (1927) overruling Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 143
Wash. 606, 255 Pac. 961 (1927); noted in 41 HAgv. L. Rav. 894 (1928). See also
49 WASH An'Y GFN. Op. 12 (1949).
98 § 2 read: "That the following acts shall constitute offenses against the purity of
such water supply: swimming, fishing, and boating in Cle Elum Lake; dumping raw
sewage into any lake, river, spring, stream, creek or tributary constituting the source
of supply of water of the City of Cle Elum, or camping on the shores of said streams,
lakes,.. !" Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 143 Wash. 606, 609, 255 Pac. 961, 962 (1927).
99 Id. at 610, 255 Pac. at 963, REM. CoMp. STAT. §§ 9127 and 9473 authorized cities
to pass penal ordinances protecting their water supplies "whether the same, or any part
thereof, lie within the corporate limits of such town or city or outside thereof .0 0Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 606, 261 Pac. 112 (1927).
101 Id. at 589, 261 Pac. at 112.
102 The constitutional provision itself, goes only to constitutionally granted power.
The court did not feel compelled to discuss why the legislature could not additionally
expand the constitutional grant of power, nor was there discussion of the justification
for construing the provision as a limitation on legislative power to delegate.
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this interpretation of the case be the correct one, then there can be
no delegation of power in Washington to cities for zoning extraterri-
torial lands. However, it is possible that this case can be restricted
solely to attempts to give extraterritorial effects to penal ordinances.
But the court's reasoning is generalized, and by its own terms, it would
apply to all ordinances. In any event, even this latter interpretation
would inhibit extraterritorial zoning, for zoning ordinances usually
carry misdemeanor sanctions for their violations. My equivocation here
comes from the court's last paragraph where, without illustrations, it
said, "the effect of holding this ordinance invalid will not be, of course,
to render the municipalities powerless from interference ... but, with-
out a constitutional amendment, penal ordinances.., cannot be given
extraterritorial effect."' Art XI, sec. 11, is not, on its face, restricted
to penal ordinances; however, given judicial attitude so disposed, fu-
ture litigation may so restrict it, and Brown v. Cle Elum, to such a
view.
ZoNING IN AccoRDANcE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
Quite apart from the constitutional delegation of police power to
municipalities, supplemental legal authority to zone was expressly dele-
gated in 1935 by the Washington legislature.'0" However, enactments
of zoning ordinances certainly antedated this general planning and
zoning enabling legislation. Much early zoning occurred on a selec-
tive, ad hoc basis and' repeatedly involved the establishment of mu-
nicipal "fire limits." These ordinances were enacted in an attempt to
curb fire by prohibiting the construction of wooden buildings within
certain established zones labeled, "fire limits." The measures have
been upheld' since early times,00 even to the extent of. declaring a
newly constructed building which was erected contrary to the prohi-
bition to be a nuisance, authorizing its removal, and assessing removal
costs against the owner who constructed it in violation of the ordi-
103 Brown v. City of Cie: Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 591, 261 Pac. 112, 113 (1927).
104 RCW 35.63; Wash. Sess. Laws 1935 c. 44.
105 City of Olynipia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 25 Pac. 337 (1890) ; Baxter v. City of
Seattle, 3 Wash. 352, 28 Pac. 537 (1891) ; Davison v. City of Walla Walla, 52 Wash.
453, 100 Pac. 981 (1909); Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 Pac. 1067
(1910) ; Nolan v. Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 212 Pac. 1048 (1923) ; City of Seattle v.
Seibert, 129 Wash. 346, 225 Pac. 67 (1924).
106 The die was cast in 1890 when the court could not see that Olympia's "fire limit"
ordinance "was passed in a spirit of wanton disregard of proprietary rights." City of
Olympia v. Mann, mtpra note 105 at 399, 25 Pac. at 340.
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nance.1 °7 Later, the court approved "fire limit" ordinances which pro-
hibited repairs on wooden buildings which had been damaged by fire
when the damage exceeded some council-approved ratio of the build-
ing's prior value." 8 It should be pointed out that these early attempts
at zoning were piecemeal, and on a pragmatically expedient basis.
The most important point here is that these first zoning ordinances
were not viewed as tools used to implement a comprehensive com-
munity design. Comprehensive planning was still in its infancy, but
zoning had already become widespread, sometimes with less than ad-
mirable results. "The great tragedy of most of the zoning in the
United States is that it was developed before we had any community
plans to serve as the framework for the zoning ordinance.' O°
The beginning linkage of comprehensive planning tied to rational
zoning was introduced by Washington's major cities just after the turn
of this century. Operating under the constitution's home rule pro-
vision, Seattle, in 1910, adopted a charter amendment creating a mu-
nicipal planning commission, and charged it with the task of developing
a comprehensive plan for the city's future growth. Fourteen of the
planning commission's twenty-one members were to be appointed by
the mayor from a list of candidates recommended by certain business
and professional groups, which were designated by the charter amend-
ment. Supposedly, each named organization would nominate two peo-
ple, one of whom would then be selected by the mayor."' Litigation
ensued. The trial court sustained a demurrer to a complaint, and on
appeal, the charter amendment was attacked along several fronts:
(1) although persons ultimately selected for the planning commission
had to be Seattle citizens, there was no requirement that the organi-
zation membership, itself, had to be comprised of local citizens; con-
sequently, it was alleged, this procedure allowed non-citizens-both
non-citizen to Seattle and perhaps to the state--to direct municipal
107 Baxter v. City of Seattle, supra note 105. See also Taggart, Legal Machinery
for the Enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance at 19-29 in Bureau of Gov. Res. and
Services, U.W., Zoning Administration and Enforcement, Info. Bull. No. 164 (Feb. 15,
1954).
los Thirty per cent was approved "when it is remembered that the purpose of a fire-
limit is to prevent the destruction of human life and property by fire." Davison v. City
of Walla Walla, supra note 105 at 456, 100 Pac. at 982. This rationale would justify
any ratio for it does not deal with the question of degree which was before the court,
but with the existence of the power to impose any ratio. Later, the burden of proof
showing the necessary destruction (fifty per cent) was put on the city. DeVon v. Town
of Oroville, 120 Wash. 317, 270 Pac. 231 (1922). But failure to provide a mode of
computation by ordinance does not render the measure unconstitutional. Behrend v.
Town of Pe Ell, 136 Wash. 364, 240 Pac. 12 (1925).
109 BLUCHER, COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 12.
,10 See Bussell v. Gill, 58 Wash. 468, 471, 108 Pac. 1080, 1081, 1082 (1910).
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affairs (the charter had authorized non-citizen members of these groups
to nominate two persons for the city's planning commission); (2) to
the extent the planning commission was empowered to spend funds,
it was argued that, for the same reasons, the new charter provisions
authorized expenditures of municipal funds by non-elected, non-resi-
dents, and finally, (3) that by granting the nomination privilege to
the named groups, the charter amendment discriminated against other
non-named organizations contrary to the privileges and immunity sec-
tion of the Washington constitution. 1
The Washington court made surprisingly short work of these argu-
ments. Since the charter amendment had been approved by the voters,
even though non-residents participated in the nominating process, the
court failed "to see how, in the absence of an express constitutional
inhibition, that fact invalidates the charter amendment.""' As far as
the second point was concerned, the court could "find no merit in this
contention.""'  Nor could it sustain the argument based on the privi-
leges and immunity section of the Washington constitution because
the court believed that those words should receive the same meaning
as the terms had obtained in the federal constitution's fourteenth
amendment!"" To the court's mind, the right of recommendation, con-
ferred by the charter amendment, was not by its nature, so funda-
mental a right of a citizen to have been within the mind of the framers
of that federal organic law, and hence, the right of recommendation
received no constitutional protection. The net result of this litigation
provided court approval of a procedure which enabled cities of the
first class, by charter amendment, to develop planning commissions
which might coordinate zoning and comprehensive planning. But even
so, there were still many remaining problems, and cities of the lower
classes would probably have to await enabling legislation before they
could link comprehensive planning and zoning.
" WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
112 Bussell v. Gill, supra note 110 at 474, 108 Pac. at 1083.
"51 Id. at 475, 108 Pac. at 1083. Here the court doubtfully relied on State v. Rip-
linger, 30 Wash. 281, 70 Pac. 748 (1902) which compelled Seattle's comptroller to issue
warrants on the city treasury solely upon certification of the library board, without
council action. But, that case did not deal with the question of the power of municipal
voters to authorize non-residents to draw on city funds; that was admitted in Riplinger,
but was the issue in Bussell. The issue in Riplinger was whether the charter section
authorizing fund disbursements by the librarian was "in conflict... with and repugnant
to the [subsequent] provisions, being the last expression of the law making power on
that subject." State v. Riplinger, 30 Wash. 281, 287, 70 Pac. 748, 749 (1902).
"14 Bussell v. Gill, upra note 105 at 476, 108 Pac. at 1083. This approach is contra
to that of the United States Supreme Court which is based on notions of dual citizen-
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In the winter of 1935, the Washington legislature authorized local
communities to establish a city or county planning commission of from
three to twelve members." 5 These commissions are empowered to
make investigations, collate data, and develop and recommend to the
local legislature a comprehensive community plan. 16 The act is sim-
ply a bit of permissive legislation and sets out proper procedures only
in a most general way. Yet, though general, strict compliance is nec-
essary, else enacted ordinances will be invalid." 7 Except as otherwise
provided by statute, the establishment of the specifics of zoning pro-
cedure is left to the discretion of cities, and they fit the details of
procedure to their individual requirements.
The Washington legislature, however, has followed the customary
path of providing for certain guarantees of citizen participation in the
zoning process. Through its staff which operates as a research and
fact-finding agency, the Planning Commission is an investigatory body
and thereby serves as an instrument of preliminary public adjust-
ment."' When conducting the required hearings, property owners can
make their desires known to the planning commission well before any
action is taken by either the commission or the city council. Having
notified and heard all persons interested and having synthesized other
research materials, the commission then prepares comprehensive plans
and preliminary drafts of zoning ordinances which, in turn, can be
presented to the council. Under these circumstances, a zoning ordi-
nance is more likely to obtain a consensus of community opinion, than
if the council were to enact ordinances without coordinated studies.
Citizen participation in the formulation of plans is the paramount
reason which underlies the statutory requirement that the commission
shall hold at least one public hearing on the initial plan before rec-
ommending it to the local legislature. Once presented to the council
and after having been found to promote the end purposes of zoning,
ship resulting in separate state and federal citizenship rights, privileges and obligations.
See Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1823) ; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36
(1873) ; and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Seemingly, the Washington
court recognized this interpretation of the Slaughter House Cases when it relied on
them seventeen years earlier in City of Spokane v. Robison, 6 Wash. 547, 33 Pac. 960
(1893).
15 RCW 35.63; Wash. Sess. Laws 1935 c. 44, § 9.
116 RCW 35.63.060.
3.1 See 8 MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 66-8 (3d ed. 1950).
118 RCW 35.63.100 requires notice and hearing before the planning commission before
it can recommend a plan to the council, and RCW 35.63.120 requires notice and a




the plan can become the basis of further zoning activity. After a sec-
ond public hearing, the local legislature, by ordinance or resolution,
"may divide the municipality or any portion thereof into [zoning]
districts.... "119
Until recently, the relationship between the planning commission
and the council, or boaird of county commissioners, has been unclear,
resulting in several problems, one of which was squarely presented in
Lauterbach v. City of Centralia.' The 1935 enabling act provided,
in part, that any ordinance adopting any plan "or any part thereof,
may be amended, supplemented or modified by subsequent ordinance
or resolution adopted upon recommendation of or with the concurrence
of the commission."'' [Emphasis added] In August of 1949, both
after having-set up a planning commission and after having passed a
zoning ordinance, thereby taking advantage of the powers conferred
by the enabling statute, the Centralia city commission passed ordi-
nances indicating that "the City Commission may,... after public
hearing, and with the concurrence of the Planning Commission, chane
... zoning districts and "the regulations herein established."' 22 Five
years later, on April 20, 1954, the City Commission passed two ordi-
nances. One, an amendatory ordinance to the 1949 provision elimi-
nated the necessity of obtaining the planning commission's concurrence
before changing zoning district boundary lines, and the other, a sub-
stantive measure, sought to rezone some land, part of which was owned
by plaintiff, from a residential-use to a commercial-use district. Plain-
tiff contended that the 1954 ordinances were illegal and void as a
matter of law because the planning commission had -refused to join
in the rezoning plans. The changes were, in fact, adopted over the
express objections of the planning commission.2 3 The trial court
agreed, enjoining the ordinances. Centralia appealed, arguing that
the statute, as construed, was unconstitutional because, such an inter-
pretation would contravene its constitutional grant of police power.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, answering the city's con-
tentions by saying that "the city did not purport to exercise its police
power, regardless of the statute."'2 And, in any event, the statute was
119 RCW 35.63.110.
.20 49 Wn2d 550, 304 P2d 656 (1956), and see, Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 289
P.2d 203 (1955).
121 Wash. Sess. Laws 1935 c. 44, § 9; RRS § 9322-9; cf. RCW 35.63.120.
122 Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, supra note 120, at 552, 304 P.2d at 658.
1
23 Id. at 556-557, 304 Pac. at 660.
1
2 4 Id. at 555, 304 Pac. at 659.
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"a general law," i.e., a limitation upon the constitutional grant, hence,
"there is no interference by the legislature with the police power of
the city.'
1 25
More important was the court's holding that a city commission could
not amend a zoning provision contrary to the recommendation or with-
out the concurrence of the planning commission.' 6 Construing the
word "upon" as connoting the same as "on condition that," the court
held that the statute created a state of dependence requiring "a rec-
ommendation that action be taken before the ordinance may be
amended."' 27 It should be noted here that the planning commission's
recommendations operated as a condition precedent to the city com-
mission's action. The commission could not exercise its power to zone
without meeting the necessary condition, but the city commission was
in no way compelled to act and accept a recommendation of the plan-
ning commission. In this latter sense, the action of the planning com-
mission was advisory. This last point was decided a year earlier, in a
case which involved an interpretation of the permissive word "may"
found earlier in the statute. 2
There are obvious gains to be derived by tying a council's actions
to the precedent condition of a planning commission's recommenda-
tions. Petty politics and insidious pressures are dampened or con-
trolled, and also, a more dispassionate and a more equal supervision
of the zoning laws usually can be obtained, resulting in a greater real-
ization of over-all community goals. This necessarily is at the sacrifice
of some council discretion and its so-called aspects of "political re-
sponsibility." In fact, were frequent amendments made to zoning
ordinances which truly reflected fluctuating "political responsibility,"
they would probably destroy a carefully prepared professional plan,
and be declared void as attempts at spot zoning which bear no rea-
sonable relation to the over-all general welfare. Nonetheless, the Wash-
ington legislature has not stood ready to make the sacrifice. Conse-
quently, in 1957, the statute was amended, and today, "the council or
board... may affirm, modify or disaffirm any decision of the com-
mission. '
125 Ibid. But cf. dissenting opinion at 559-62, 304 Pac. at 662-63.
126 Id. at 557-9, 304 Pac. at 661-2.
127 Ibid.
128 Lillions v. Gibbs, supra note 120.
129 See, RCW 35.63.120. No cases have interpreted this new provision. It could
have been more effectively drafted for currently two public hearings are required before
a city may zone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, see note 118 supra. Other
than being superfluously time consuming, the second hearing before the council sub-
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Spot zoning,10 a vicious practice, may soon present problems which
will receive more attention in Washington, since -the legislature's sev-
erance of the city council from the planning commission. Although
pressures for amendments may be great, if a comprehensive plan is
propertly prepared there will be few justifications for amending zon-
ing ordinances. If amendments are made, they must be consistent with
overall community development, 1' and "the question is always what
will best serve the public interests, not what may be the desires of a
particular group residing in the vicinity of the area sought to be
zoned."'3 2 The Washington court has disapproved of spot zoning, " '
indicating that even though some persons reap unjustified benefits from
the practice going undetected, that fact alone does not preclude en-
forcing the ordinance against others.'34 Notwithstanding these admo-
nitions, most lawyers, utterly unaware of the proper way to initiate
a zoning amendment, think they are advancing their client's cause
when they describe his land with particularity in their petitions for
rezoning. Thus conceived, their, request is a patent solicitation for
spot zoning, placing both the planning commission and the city coun-
cil in an untenable position. Occasionally a sympathetic commission
will bail them out by initiating a suggestion that the rezoning request
include at least one block, perhaps more. To be properly prepared,
the lawyer should consult all land owners in the proposed area for re-
zoning; secure their consent for his plans, and then be prepared to
advance to the council the nature of the community benefits which
will flow from his rezoning proposal. Otherwise, he runs a great risk
of failure should the matter be subjected to judicial review.
jects a professionally prepared plan to political pressures which may hotly favor the
interests of a vocal few, to the public detriment. Responsible council decisions in such
circumstances become more difficult, at best.
13D For succinct analysis of "spot zoning" see Davis v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 460,
45 N.W.2d 172 (1950);- and Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 175
P.2d 542 (1946) ; 1 Y LEY 202-224.
131 Attempts to "spot zone" have been almost universally condemned for failure to
meet this criterion. See Cassel v. Mayor, of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A2d 486
(1950) ; Edgewood Civic Club v. Blaisdell, 95 N.H. 244, 61 A.2d 517 (1948) ; Polk v.
Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208 S.W.2d 497 (1948) ; Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632,
165 P.2d 280 (1948), and Annot.: 128 A.L.R. 740 (1940) ; 149 A.L.R. 292 (1944).
132 State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes, 13 Wn.2d 306, 316, 125 P.2d 262, 266 (1942)
(said in another context). Generally zoning amendments have contributed to overall
neighborhood decline; see-Comment, 48 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 470, 474 (1953). '
13 See State ex reL. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216, 225, 242, P.2d 505, 510 (1952).
Also, Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn.2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952) was an attempt to in-
validate particular spot zoning amendments on the ground that the spot would create
a nuisance.
134 State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, supra note 133; see, Safeway Stores v. City Council
of City of San Mateo, 86 Cal. App.2d 277, 194 P.2d 720 (1948) ; and Ventresca v.
Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 56 A.2d 210 (1948). Annot., 119 A.L.R. 1509 (1939).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ZONING ORDINANCES
Since "the operating principle of modern zoning regulations is in
some respects the antithesis of the rugged individualism of pioneer,
frontier times," ' S the attitude which prevails during judicial review
of zoning ordinances plays a crucial role in determining the factual
effectiveness of land-use planning. Sadly enough, evidence is still pre-
sented which shows that some courts continue a bias prejudicial to the
fundamental postulates of zoning,'36 and a few of them continue, under
the guise of judicial review, to substitute their judgment for that dis-
cretion which properly resides in another body politic." 7 In Wash-
ington, however, a more salutary attitude prevails, and the court ordi-
narily will not substitute its judgment for that of zoning authorities. 3
But, before there can be any judicial review of a local governing
body's action, one must first get before a court. There can be no ap-
peal from a refusal to rezone, regardless of how meritorious the re-
zoning plea might be. 3 ' Consequently, aggrieved parties, having the
proper standing to sue,"'0 must attack either the zoning ordinance it-
self or a refusal to act under it. One may seek to enjoin enforcement
of zoning measures as they are applied to specific lands, 4' or pursue
mandamus compelling an issuance of a permit.'42 In addition, suits at
law for declaratory judgments are possible,4 3 or one might couple a
135 Pearson v. Evans, 51 Wn.2d 574, 577, 320 P.2d 300, 302 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
136 E.g., see, City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919 at 943
(Colo. 1959) ; Note, 35 NoTRE DAME LAW. 477 (1960).
137 City & County of Denver v. Perlmutter Construction Co., 131 Colo. 230, 280
P.2d 1107 (1955) ; and Jones v. Board of Adj., 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949).
138 But cf., Shields v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 31 Wn.2d 247, 196 P2d 352(1948) ; see note 171, infra.
139 Besselman v. City of Moses Lake, 46 Wn.2d 279, 280 P.2d 689 (1955).
140 See State v. Lovelase, 118 Wash. 50, 203 Pac. 28 (1921) ; see Peck, Standing
Requirements for Obtaining Review of Governmental Action in Washington, 35 WASH.
L. REV. 362 (1960), see generally id. 379-86.
141 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, supra note 31 was a suit for a mandatory injunc-
tion; for prohibitory injunctions see, generally, City Cab, Carriage and Transfer Co.
v. Hayden, 73 Wash. 24, 131 Pac. 472 (1913) and cases cited, note 29 supra. But,
before a citizen can obtain injunctive relief against a zoning ordinance, he must estab-
lish special damages to his person or property. Desimone v. City of Seattle, 35 Wn.2d
579, 213 P.2d 948 (1950).
142 See State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of
Wenatchee, 50 Wn.2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957) ; State ex rel. Brinker v. Town of
Oak Harbor, 48 Wn.2d 839, 296 P.2d 1004 (1956) ; State ex rel. Ogden v. City of
Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954); and Annots., 86 A.L.R. 792 (1933);
136 A.L.R. 1378 (1942). Compare Hester v. Thomson, 35 Wash. 119, 76 Pac. 734
(1904) (mandamus) with State ex rel. Grimmer v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 388,
116 Pac. 878 (1911) (writ of prohibition).
143 See State ex rel. Lyon v. Board of County Commissioners of Pierce County,
31 Wn.2d 366, 373, 196 P.2d 997, 1001 (1948), and Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1361 (1938).
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suit for a declaratory judgment with a request for an injunction, there-
by enforcing, in the same suit, one's rights along with their declara-
tion.' As between two private property owners, an injunction'" or
an action to abate a nuisance'" will lie to enforce valid zoning provi-
sions against prohibited land uses, the measures themselves being sub-
ject to attack by way of defense.:4
Conversely, municipal authorities may initiate zoning suits and pros-
ecute for violations of an ordinance, 4 or seek injunctions prohibiting
a land owner from violating an ordinance,"4 9 or require the removal
of a structure which violates a zoning provision.'
A special avenue which ought not to be overlooked is that of nui-
sance, for no meager measure of zoning has been accomplished by
judges through nuisance cases.'51 These are not merely the usual next-
door-neighbor type irritations,'52 but cases of multiple plaintiffs.5 . which
focus judicial eyes onto land uses within an entire district, rather than
on the usually myopic area owned by a single plaintiff.'54 Some courts
continue to adjudicate nuisance cases in vague and scrambled doc-
trinal terms relating "gravity of harm" to "social utility of conduct,"
rather than honestly facing the problem of producing a functionally
integrated land-use pattern.'55 But careful analysis shows that, simi-
144 RCW 7.24. However, copies of the complaint must be served on the attorney
general. Roehl v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 43 Wn2d 214, 261 P2d 92 -(1953), and
see, 1 ANDERsoN, ACTioNs FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 834-849 (2d ed. 1951).
115 See Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wn.2d 200, 248 P.2d 408 (1952) ; Park v. Stolzheise,
24 Wn.2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946) ; Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177,
206 Pac. 976 (1922) ; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 885 (1940).
146 See Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn.2d402, 341 P.2d 499 (1959);
Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn.2d 275, 300 P.2d 569 (1956). This includes an anticipated
nuisance; see, Turner v. City of Spokane, 39 Wn2d 332, 235 P.2d 300 (1951).
"47 State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes Inv. Corp., 13 Wn2d 306, 125 P.2d 306 (1942).
148 City Of Everett v. Unsworth, 54 Wn.2d 760, 344 P.2d 728 (1959) ; City of Spo-
kane v. Coon, 3 Wn.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36 (1940).
14 King County v. Lunn, 32 Wn.2d 116, 200 P.2d 981 (1948).
'150 City of Everett v. Unsworth, supra note 148 at 764, 344 P.2d at 730; Baxter v.
City of Seattle, 3 Wash. 352, 28 Pac. 537 (1891) ; and Davison v. City of Walla Walla,
52 Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981 (1909). See, Van Soelen, Abatement of Buildings as Public
Nuisances, 38 DICTA 237 (1960).
151 Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955
Wis. L. Rxv. 440.
152 E.g., "Consider for example the case of the big red rooster, Myer v. Minard,
21 So. 2d 72 (La. 1945) where the plaintiff's only complaint was that defendant's big
red rooster crowed always at 5 A.M. and every fifteen minutes thereafter until 6:30
A.M. The Court said that the rooster's cheery outbursts at the break of day cannot
be sufficiently disturbing to a person of ordinary sensibilities, normal habits and tastes
to be a nuisance. Quare, is there proof here that the average judge is too old to sleep
beyond daybreak?" Id. at 441, n. 8.
'53 E.g., National Container Corp. v. State ex rel. Stockton, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4
(1939) had 90 plaintiffs.
.54 Note the broad considerations in Harris v. Skirving, supra note 145.
155 "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance."' PRossER, TORTS 389 (2d ed. 1955).
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lar to planning commissions, the judicial mind in its painful pin-
pricking process is becoming sensitive to considerations regarding the
"character of the neighborhood."1 8 As this desirable trend becomes
stronger, due to more intensive land-use demands, nuisance doctrine
probably will come to reflect a functional treatment of land-use ad-
judication, fully influenced by, and integrated with, notions of modern
comprehensive planning." ' Then truly, the doctrines of private nui-
sance will cease to be regarded as relating solely to tortious conduct.
Instead, they will realistically be viewed as describing the property
interest invaded by a wrongdoer, being viewed from a functionally
integrated vantage point.'58
In Washington, a plaintiff can sue on nuisance theory arguing either,
(1) that a violation of a zoning ordinance is a nuisance per se, 5 ' or
(2) that a land use constitutes a common law nuisance in fact.' He
may pursue an injunctive remedy upon a showing of special damages
to him, e.g., diminution in value of his property resulting from a zoning
violation,1"' or, alternatively, he can pursue damages. 6' But the fact
of diminished land value alone, though relative to establishing the fact
of nuisance, is not in and of itself sufficient.' 6' "The fundamental in-
quiry in cases of this kind is whether the use to which the property
is put is reasonable or unreasonable."' 64 By itself, this statement im-
plies only that the matter is subject to judicial review; however, in
deciding what was reasonable, the court looked to "the character of
the neighborhood," to determine whether the specific use was func-
156 Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn.2d 275, 281, 300 P.2d 569, 572 (1956), and Beuscher
& Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440.
157 But, we might query the relative expertise of judicial zoning via nuisance doc-
trine which necessarily rests on lawyer manipulation of partisan testimony, against that
expertness residing in the planning commission using the zoning approach.
158 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 822 (1939), and PROSSER, TORTS, 389-401 (2 ed.
1955).
159 Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., supra note 146. But compare Park v.
Stolzheise, supra note 145, with Turner v. City of Spokane, supra note 146.
160 The leading case is Shields v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, supra note 138;
Harris v. Skirving, supra note 145, Morin v. Johnson, spra note 156 (on appeal, the
court treated this case, in part, as one of nuisance per se).
161 Desimone v. City of Seattle, 35 Wn.2d 579, 213 P.2d 948 (1958), and see, Annot.,
129 A.L.R. 885 (1940). But cf. Morin v. Johnson, supra note 156, where the court
approved, as harmless error, a trial court's disallowance of proof showing diminished
land value.
162 Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., supra note 146.
163 "Any business may be so carried on as not to be a nuisance, and yet may impair
the value of adjoining property." Morin v. Johnson, supra note 156 at 282, 300 P.2d
at 573.
:164 Id. at 280, 300 P.2d at 571 ; see also Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wn.2d




tionally integrated into the over-all land pattern and its prospective
growth.
6 5
A recent case indicates that a city of the first class, when exercising
its police power, may declare a land use to be a nuisance and abate
it, or impose fines, without resort to the courts. 6 But in an earlier
case, the court said that the decision whether a land use is or is not a
nuisance in violation of a zoning ordinance, is a conclusion of law and
not a finding of fact, even though termed that by a lower court.'
Accordingly, the separation of powers doctrine would necessitate that
only the courts can declare a specific land use to be a nuisance. This
appears the better view16s and does not detract from the long standing
power of a local legislature to declare, by ordinance, that certain land
uses generally constitute a nuisance. 69 To hold otherwise would dis-
regard the constitutional grant of police power to municipalities. Not
only can a municipality declare legislatively what constitutes a nui-
sance, but also it can legitimate a land use that otherwise could have
been abated,.. for nothing maintained under the express authority of
a statute or ordinance can be deemed a nuisance."' Given the above
propositions, nuisance doctrines provide a basis for private enforce-
ment of zoning ordinances, eliminating nonconforming uses, provided
always that the zoning ordinance itself be valid.
The grounds which can be used for attacking a zoning measure vary
considerably, but when the constitutionality of an ordinance is chal-
lenged, the burden on the complainant is heavy. He must show the
municipality's action to be unreasonable- and arbitrary, and that its
reasonableness is not fairly debatable."2 For if the matter be fairly
165 Id. at 281, 300 P2d at 572.
166 City of Everett v. Unsworth, sipra note 148 at 764, 344 P.2d at 730; see, RCW
35.22.280(31) and Davison v. City of Walla Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981" (1909).
This was held not to abridge WASH. CoNST. amend. 28 requiring all actions to abate a
nuisance to be brought in the superior court. Compare RCW 35.22.460 in the case
where an ordinance defines a nuisance, since this statute confers jurisdiction over
municipally defined violations onto municipal courts.
167 Hauser v. Arness, 44 Wn.2d 358, 267 P.2d 691 (1954) ; Wygal v. Kilwein, 41
Wn.2d 281, 248 P2d 893 (1952).
16s See City of Everett v. Unsworth, supra note 148 at 763, 300 P.2d at 730.
169 E.g., Shepard v. City of Seattle, 569 Wash. 363, 109 Pac. 1067 (1910) ; DeVon v.
Town of Oroville, 120 Wash. 317, 207 Pac. 231 (1922).
170 E.g., an undertaking parlor. Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177,
206 Pac. 976 (1922).
171 However, this appears qualified by the "nuisance in law vs. nuisance in fact'
dichotomy of Shields v. Spokane School Dist No. 81, supra note 138. A "nuisance in
fact' qualifies under the zoning ordinance, but appears in an "improper place or man-
ner"; i.e., to the judicial mind. Wherever the zoning ordinance specifically enumerates
the allowable uses included within a zone, the use of the Shields distinction results in a
blatant substitute of judicial judgment for that of a planning commission.
172 1 YoKLEY 469-476; 1 -RATHKOPF 21, 2-41.
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debatable, the legislative judgment must stand.' A parade of horrible
possibilities is not a sound reason for invalidating an ordinance. "There
is time enough to deal with the possibilities if they become realities. '
Perhaps more so than other ordinances, zoning provisions must com-
ply fully with all requisite procedural steps.' Every zoning ordinance
must be integrated with a zoning map which identifies the areas in
which restrictive land uses are imposed. 6 A city council cannot act
beyond the scope of authority delegated it by the constitution or en-
abling legislation.' Nor may it sub-delegate the power to zone. 8
And, state statutes, though general, must be rigorously followed, else
enacted measures will be invalid. However, if a town clerk fails to
keep a statutorily required ordinance book for recordation purposes,
the failure to record a zoning ordinance in it will not make the meas-
ure null and void in absence of a statute so declaring.' 9 Also, it should
be noted that challenges to procedure must be specific; for a general
denial answering a pleading which has alleged proper passage of an
ordinance, "merely questions the power of the city to pass the ordi-
nance, not that the preliminary steps were not properly taken."' 80
Generally, until the contrary is shown, the usual construction prevails
-that the ordinance was properly enacted and lies within the city's
173 Ibid.
17 4 Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, .supra note 164 at 625, 328 P.2d at 879.
175 See Savage v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 1, 112 Pac. 78 (1910) ; Tennent v.
City of Seattle, 83 Wash. 108, 145 Pac. 83 (1914). Zoning ordinances are of two types:
inclusive and exclusive. The inclusive ones permit specifically enumerated uses within
the district, all others being excluded; exclusive ordinances exclude certain uses, per-
mitting any other use not specifically excluded. Inclusive measures put the burden on
the landowner to show that his proposed use qualifies, and they are probably unfair in
that it is impossible for a council to specify every proper, future use of land. Yet, ex-
clusive ordinances are unfair too, because odious future uses not contemplated by the
council are not excluded, and a city may suffer a noxious use. Most ordinances are of
the inclusive type, see HoRAcx & NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS 46 (1955) ; see gen-
erally, 1 YOKLEY 77; BASSETT, MODEL LAWS FOR PLANNING CITIES (Harv. Planning
Series, 1935).
176 RCW 35.63.090 provides: "All regulations shall be worked out as parts of a
comprehensive plan..." See Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955) ; 1 RATHKOPF 9-1. The zoning map should be distinguished
from the land-use map, made as part of the master plan. The land-use map depicts
existing uses of individual parcels of land, but the zoning map shows general classifi-
cations of allowable land uses within districts.
177 Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659
(1947).
178 Blitch v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 (1940); In re Wilson, 32
Minn. 145, 19 N.W. 723 (1884).
L79 DeVon v. Town of Oroville, 120 Wash. 317, 207 Pac. 231 (1922). (The original
was introduced into evidence.)
180 Davison v. City of Walla Walla, 52 Wash. 453, at 455, 100 Pac. 981 (1909).
Plaintiffs must show that the procedural irregularity affected the section under which
they are aggrieved. State v. Lovelace, 118 Wash. 50, 203 Pac. 28 (1921).
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powers, 81 having been passed in good faith.182
It is notorious that rules of statutory construction do not actually
decide cases and that they are in hopeless confusion. 8 Likewise, the
presumptive validity of zoning ordinances is neither as effective nor
as clear as one might wish. At the outset it should be marked that.
ordinances are not treated like statutes in one respect: Courts do not
take judicial notice of municipal zoning ordinances, and, like all other
facts, they must be pleaded and proved." ' "It is, of course, the gen-
eral rule that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of
a law or ordinance,"'8 5 and where a measure admits of two construc-,
tions, one rendering it constitutional and the other not, the constitu-
tional construction will be p'referred.18 But, since zoning ordinances
derogate against, and restrict, traditional common law conceptions of
allowable land uses,' exceptions have been made to the general rule.
The disturbing fact about this development is that one is never really
quite sure whether the court will invoke the general rile or one of its
exceptions. Zoning ordinances "should not be extended by implication
to cases not clearly within the scope of the purpose and intent mani-
fest in their language;,""' yet, the court has also maintained that "they
should be liberally construed to accomplish their plain purpose and
intent."' 89 It is probably unwise to place such great faith in the crys-
talline character of words. ° Court adumbrations on the presumptive
legitimacy of zoning measures have been inconsistent. The court's
vacillation has resulted in an existing set of complementary opposite
181 State v. Lawton, 25 Wn.2d 750, 172 P.2d 465 (1946) ; Wood v. City of Seattle,
23 Wash. 1, 62 Pac. 135 (1900).182 Cornelius v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 213 Pac. 17 (1923); Allen v.- City
of Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18 (1917).
.18 Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of-Appellate Decision and the Rules or Can-
ons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 395 (1950); Frank-
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUm. L. REv.- 528 (1947);
and Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. Ra,. 863 (1930).
184 If the pleading goes to number, date and title, then the court will take judicial
notice, if the ordinance be properly recorded. Knight v. Pang, 32 Wn.2d 217, 201 P.2d
198 (1948); Dixon v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wn.2d 508, 171 P.2d 243 (1946); 1
YoKLEY 465.
185 City of Spokane v. Coon, 3 Wn.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36 (1940) ; accord, McDermott
v. State, 197 Wash. 79, 84 P.2d 372 (1938) ; Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d
615 (1936).
186 Hauser v. Arness, 44 Wn.2d 358, 370, 267 P.2d 691, 698 (1954).
187 See McDougal, The Influence of Metropolis on Concepts, Rules and Institutions
Relating to Property, 4 J. OF Pu. LAw 93 (1955), and Cross, The Dininishing Fee,
20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1954).
188 Hauser v. Arness, supra note 186 at,370, 267 P.2d at 698.
189 Id. at 370, 267 P.2d at 698.
"DO See Koazynsxr, SCIENCE AND SANITY (1944); MORRIS, FourDATio OF THE
THEORY OF SIGNS, 1 INT'L EN cY. OF U~nmIE ScIEN E, No. 2 (1938) ; Compare Arnold,
The Traps Which Lie in Definitions and Polar Words in THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITAL-
ISm 165-184 (1937) with Goodhart, The Importance of a Definition of Law, 3 J. AFRI-
cAN Aimix. 106 (1951).
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presumptions,'91 one which can be indulged to favor constitutionality,'92
and the other-"zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common
law and must be strictly construed"' 93 -can be invoked to cast the die
against a zoning provision, denying a community the realization of its
comprehensive planning.
In the absence of fraud patently perpetrated,'94 the Washington
court early decided that it will not strike a zoning provision, valid on
its face, because the court disapproves of a council's motives lying
behind the measure.' And, although mandamus will lie to review an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of a council's discretion, 9 ' it will not
lie to compel a general course of official conduct such as the proper
supervision of a "no parking" ordinance. 7 The writ is available, how-
ever, to compel a proper exercise of discretion where previously it has
been exercised arbitrarily.' But, it cannot be used to compel a city
to rezone specific lots, however fair, reasonable, and desirable the
change may be.'99 Consequently, local units have a cudgel over a
property owner and can refuse to rezone his highway frontage lands
from a residential to an industrial use until the land owner, at his
expense, either provides for the necessary drainage or grants the city
an easement for a drainage ditch across one of his lots.2"0 In such a
case, a council's motives are deemed irrelevant to its failure to rezone,
but the court has authorized other grounds which will upset zoning
legislation.
The heart of any zoning ordinance lies in the decision of local au-
thorities concerning the nature of the uses to be permitted within
designated districts. If a city is to be divided "according to classifi-
cation," what are the proper determinants of the districts? Unques-
191 See OLIPHANT & HEWITT, FOREWARD TO RUEFF, FROM THE PHYSICAL TO THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1929).
192 E.g., Seattle ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952).
192 Pearson v. Evans, 51 Wn.2d 574, 576, 320 P.2d 300, 301 (1958). This is the
majority rule.
194 Kimmell v. City of Spokane, 7 Wn.2d 372, 109 P.2d 1069 (1941) ; Blade v. Town
of La Conner, 167 Wash. 403, 9 P.2d 381 (1932).
195 City of Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389, 25 Pac. 337 (1890) ; accord, Shepard v.
City of Seattle, 58 Wash. 501, 109 PaC. 1067 (1910).
196 State ex rel. Brinker v. Town of Oak Harbor, 48 Wn.2d 839, 296 P.2d 1004
(1956).
197 State ex rel. Beardslee v. Landes, 149 Wash. 570, 271 Pac. 829 (1928). This
results from court incapacity to supervise and oversee its decree, and the separation
of powers doctrine. Compare the undertaking in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).198 Hester v. Thomson, 35 Wash. 119, 76 Pac. 734 (1904).
199 Besselman v. City of Moses Lake, 46 Wn.2d 279, 280 P.2d 689 (1955).
200 Ibid. Of course, the city could have condemned the easement, but then, it would
have had to pay for it.
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tionably, the primary principle playing a predominate role in all cases
involving the propriety of zoning measures is that all municipal au-
thority to restrict the use of private lands must be based upon a valid
exercise of the police power - and this harbingers a discussion of
reasonableness. Thoughts in this area can be classified within the
traditional trilogy of grounds for attacking the zoning ordinances.
Once all the procedural steps have been followed by a governing body,
a properly enacted zoning ordinance can be invalidated in (1) that
the ordinance transcends the power delegated by the constitution or
zoning enabling legislation, and, consequently, is ultra vires,01 (2)
that the use district classifications have not been based upon reason-
able distinctions, 2 ' or (3) that regulations within a particular use dis-
trict have no substantial relation to traditional police power purposes;
hence, they deprive a property owner without due process of law2" or
their lack of uniformity denies him the law's equal protection.2"' Never-
theless, whatever the neatness involved in these classifications, the
fundamental consideration within each of these categories actually con-
sidered by the Washington court, is whether the action in question
bears a reasonable relation to the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community.
Since the constitutional grant is subject to "general law" and mu-
nicipalities have no inherent possession of police power, and since
zoning measures regulate the otherwise free use of property, munici-
pal zoning ordinances must follow enabling statutes strictly. No other
justification for such power exists."' The Washington legislature has
granted broad authority to local governments to impose land-use re-
strictions."0 Nevertheless, the cases from other jurisdictions dealing
with attempts completely to exclude a land use from a zoning classi-
fication indicate that a municipality's power is not plenary, nor subject
to exercise unreasonably.
One of the most recurring problems involves the reasonableness of
attempts to exclude churches from one zone, e.g., prime residential
districts, while permitting them in other zones, e.g., lesser residential
or commercial classifications."' The central issue in determining the
2011 YOaLEY 37-39; 1 RATHxOPF 8-6.
2021 RATHxOPF 12-1; The fourteenth amendment denies municipalities zoning power
to segregate on the basis of race, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
203 1 RATHioPF 6-20.
2041 RATHKOPF 7-1; see Manos v. City of Seattle, 173 Wash. 662, 24 P.2d 91
(1933).
205 1 YOKLEY 37.
206 RCW 35.63.080.
207 1 YoKIy 110; 1 RATHIEKOPF 19-259.
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validity of a zoning ordinance seeking wholly to exclude churches from
first residential areas would seem to deal with the first amendment's
guarantee of religious freedom. But the United States Supreme Court
has not passed on the question.'0 At least one state court recently
faced the issue, but its discussion is neither comprehensive nor ex-
haustive."' The first amendment objection could also be raised when
church buildings do not comply with local building code restrictions
on places of assembly,210 or when church activity has become a nui-
sance,211 or when sanitary requirements are not met by religious struc-
tures.1 The problem has not been solved, but slowly, a pathway is
being adumbrated.
In deciding whether a zoning ordinance which regulates the location
of churches is a reasonable exercise of police power, the decision should
turn on whether the free exercise of religion is outweighed by the pub-
lic interest in its regulation, after giving due weight to the preferred
position occupied by the first amendment within our constitutional
scheme of things. 1 It appears that when churches are excluded from
a municipality as a whole, rather than from a single zone within a city,
there is less likelihood that reasonable alternative locations exist, and
first amendment objections might be persuasive. However, the first
amendment probably ought not pre-empt churches from being excluded
from any single zone within a city, nor prevent applications to them
of building, fire, sanitary and other regulatory laws which apply to
all buildings in the zoning district.1
208 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 18 at 385, the ordinance
contained restrictions on churches, but the Court did not discuss their validity for want
of allegations that they were harmful to plaintiff. Had the Court wished, it could have
passed on the problem for it was presented in Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App.2d
12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), but instead, it dismissed for want of a federal question, 359
U.S. 436 (1959); the same fate was accorded, Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints v. Porterville, 338 U.S. 805
(1949).
209 Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. Sup.
Ct. 1959) (striking the zoning provision) ; compare, Brindel, Zoning Out Religious
Institutions, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 627 (1957) with Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1428
(1957).
210 See Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind.
83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
211 The issue was not raised and the injunction issued. Portage Township v. Full
Salvation Union, 318 Mich. 693, 29 N.W.2d 297 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S.
851 (1948).
212 Kurman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 351 Pa. 247, 40 A.2d 381 (1945).
213 See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
214 See Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Brasman, 30 N.J. 273, 152 A.2d 569
(1959), and Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1428, 1437 (1957). I do not deal with the "denial-
of-the-equal-protection-of-the-laws" argument. For it, see Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62
Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945).
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The weight of authority, has not discussed the constitutional issue,
and generally, zoning ordinances which wholly exclude churches from
residential districts have not been approved. 1 The most usual posi-
tion has been that churches can be zoned out of first-class residential
zones "only on the basis of traffic or other hazards substantially re-
lated to public health or safety," '216 other justifications being held u n-
reasonable. California has rejected the 'weight of authority and com-
mendably reasons that churches may be excluded from any zone so
long as the measure is non-discriminatory within the district in that
it prospectively treats all religious groups alike. 7 The Washington
court has not passed squarely on this problem. Recently, it noted both
positions in a case involving a collateral issue.1 8 When supporting its
opinion however, the court cited cases only embodying the majority
view. 19 The presence of these citations and dicta ought not prejudice
a full and clear consideration of the matter when the issue is presented
to the court.
Perhaps clearer than the right to regulate church locations, is the
right of Washington municipalities to regulate and locate businesses. 20
So long as operations from "any business or activity" has potentially
detrimental influences to the public, morally or otherwise, the matter
"is subject to regulation, to the end that the potential, detrimental
influence be removed. ' 221 To that end, and on the authority of the
215 See Young Israel Organization of Cleveland v. Dworldn, 105 Ohio App. 89,
133 N.E2d 174 (1956) ; Congregation Committee, North Fort Worth Congregation,
Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) ; State
ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop of Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217 '(1939);
North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 109 N.Y.S2d 803
(Sup. Ct 1951).2 16 See State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of
Wenatchee, 50 Wn.2d 378, 382, 312 P.2d 195, 197 (1957). - ' .
217 Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day
Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338
U.S. 805 (1949).
218 State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenat-
chee, supra note 216.
219 Id. at 384-385, 312 P.2d at 198-199. To be distinguished from churches are
religious schools which, for zoning purposes, are equated with public schools. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245, 152 A.2d 580 (1959) ; Brindel, Zoning
Out Religious Institutions, 32 No=RE DAME LAW. 627 (1957), and Seitz, Constitutional
and General Welfare Cotsiderations in Efforts to Zone Out Private Schools, 11 MiAMi
L.Q. 68 (1956).
220 But see Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959), and
Note, 35 WAsHr. L. Rv. 204 (1960) for problems faced by an agency seeking to pro-
mote diversity in Western Washington economy by converting agricultural into indus-
trial lands.
221 Brennan v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash. 665, 669, 276 Pac. 886, 887 (1929) ; accord,
State ex rel. Sayles v. Superior Court, 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966 (1922) (regulating
pool halls) ; Asakumra v. City of Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 Pac. 30 (1922) (regulating
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Slaughter House Cases,22  the Washington court early held the City of
Spokane to have been properly authorized by statute wholly to exclude
tanneries and slaughter houses within its city limits. 222 A city has been
held to have exercised its police power reasonably when it regulates
the location and operation of lumber yards so long as the zoning ordi-
nance does not "destroy or prohibit the continuance of an established
and otherwise lawful business.124 Likewise, hospitals can properly be
zoned out of certain use districts where "the presence of such an insti-
tution in a residential portion of the city would practically destroy the
value of property within its immediate vicinity for residence pur-
poses. '12  But, hospitals and other businesses probably stand on con-
siderations different from those regarding slaughter houses, and being
both legitimate and necessary for community welfare, they probably
cannot be absolutely prohibited within city limits. Presumably, such
an ordinance would constitute an unreasonable exercise of the police
power."'
A different ground sometimes used to invalidate zoning provisions
is that the use district classifications have not been based on reason-
able distinctions, resulting either in a deprivation of property without
due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the laws."'
These are proper issues at a trial, and if evidence is conflicting on
them, then a judge may personally survey the area before deciding
pawnbrokers) ; Manos v. City of Seattle, 146 Wash. 210, 262 Pac. 965 (1927) ; and
Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. 1043 (1928)
(dancehalls). Compare, City of Seattle, v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 108 Pac. 1086
(1910) ; State ex rel. Lane v. Fleming, 129 Wash. 646, 225 Pac. 647 (1924).
222 Supra, note 114.
222 City of Spokane v. Robison, 6 Wash. 547, 33 Pac. 960 (1893).
224 State ex rel. Modern Lumber & Millwork Co. v. MacDuff, 161 Wash. 600, 613,
297 Pac. 733, 737 (1931), adhered to in 161 Wash. 703, 297 Pac. 738 (1931). Cities
can assign curb slots to taxicabs at railway stations notwithstanding the fact that the
more distant assignments are relatively less profitable. City Cab, Carriage & Transfer
Co. v. Hayden, 73 Wash. 24, 131 Pac. 472 (1913) ; But see Seattle Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash. 594, 150 Pac. 1134 (1915).
225 Shepard v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 373, 109 Pac. 1067, 1070 (1910). (To
protect the public from spreading disease, but query, this was a mental hospital to
check mental disease?). See, also, City of Spokane v. Coon, 3 Wn.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36
(1940) ; Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn.2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946).
226 See reasoning developed in cases in note 225 supra, and State ex tel. Warner v.
Hayes Inv. Corp., 13 Wn.2d 306, 125 P.2d 262 (1942), and cases in note 221 supra.
As "regional planning" progresses, a municipality might exclude an otherwise "legiti-
mate" business since it could better function elsewhere as part of a larger social and
economic area. See, Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc., v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J.
509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
227 WASH. Co NsT. art. I, §§ 3, 12. However, regarding these, the court once said:
"Indeed, the provisions of the federal and state constitutions relied on do not apply to
legislative enactments in the exercise of the police power." State ex rel. Lane v.
Fleming, 129 Wash. 646, 648, 225 Pac. 647 (1924).
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matters."8 A leading case is State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes Inv.'Corp."2
The case dealt with a 1939 ordinance passed by the King County
Board of Commissioners which zoned, for the first time, the entire west
shore of Lake Washington between Seattle and Kenmore, classifying
the lands as first class residential uses only. Plaintiff, a property owner
near Sand Point, sought to abate as a nuisance defendant's use of water
front land as a bathing beach and trailer camp. Other than nearby
farm lands, the remaining land within the immediate vicinity of de-
fendant was either undeveloped, or used for residences, except for a
small business and industrial area around the Naval Air Station. Three
engineers from the planning commission testified that the basis of the
classification was the wishes of the people in the vicinity, but the court
could locate "no showing that the zoning of the area in question as a
first-class residence district is... reasonably necessary or requisite in
the interest of health, safety, morals and the general welfare.2) 80 This
holding which relies on the then existing lack of development of sur-
rounding lands, was entirely unnecessary for earlier the court had
found that, "even if the beach did have the effect upon adjacent
property as alleged, it would not be thereby classed as a nuisance."28'
Indeed, apart from being unnecessary, the holding is unfortunate be-
cause it forces planning commissions, when districting areas, to place
overly heavy reliance on existing land uses. This uncalibrated require-
ment is backward oriented, neglecting the fact that proper zoning is
equally concerned with the future, and is prospective looking. Zoning
is designed to shape existing uses in light of anticipated future needs,
and this may well mean changing or curtailing present uses.
There remain, in Washington, other untested and substantial dis-
tinctions between residential zones, and questions exist whether they
will be upheld as proper exercises of the police powers. Among others,
are provisions establishing (1) minimum lot sizes,282 (2) maximum
lot coverage by a building, and hence, maximum floor areas 88 and
(3) minimum yard areas for single family residences.2 84 The use of
22S Chief Petroleum Corp. v. City of Walla Walla, 10 Wn.2d 297, 116 P.2d 560
(1941).
229 13 Wn.2d 306, 125 P.2d 262 (1942)2 0 Id. at 316, 125 P.2d at 265. "The zoning of this large rural area as exclusively
a first-class residence district has no relation to public safety or morals and there is
no evidence that the public health or general welfare will be benefited by the zoning."
2 1 Id. at 314, 125 P.2d at 265.
282 E.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.16.080 (1958).
238 E.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.16.100 (1958).
284 E.g., SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.16.090 (1958). I will not deal with this possi-
bility. Requirements prescribing yard areas for light plus open spaces at the rear of
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the minimum lot size is probably the oldest technique of the three,
having its origin in a reaction against damage allegedly done by eager
real estate developers who tried to squeeze as many lots out of a given
tract of land as possible." 5 There is no Washington case squarely
passing on whether minimum lot sizes are justifiable exercises of the
police power. Other jurisdictions have upheld minimum lot ordi-
nances 36 and uniform floor area standards when applied to the entire
municipality." 7 Were the Wasihngton court to approve of these de-
velopments it would raise the question of how far might the police
power go through zoning in requiring a spacious lot and house? These
controls, when exercised over houses, have raised the cry of discrim-
ination and "economic segregation, 23. amounting to snobbery.3
Necessarily, such controls do involve economic stratification, and in
one sense, zoning is segregation. But, when confronted with these
problems the Washington court ought not be shocked by these matters
unless it is willing to be "shocked by the entire principle of zoning. 2 4 0
Another sensitive area is located when cities elect to spend huge
sums of money for civic redevelopment, and then try to insure their
undertaking by reclassifying and strictly enforcing zoning provisions.
The spotlight is then focused on building permits and the retroactive
nature of zoning ordinances. Usually, the ultimate social problem for
the courts is whether to grant a building permit on the basis of an
application which, though proper when made, does not conform to
(1) legislation pending at the time of application, or (2) legislation
both proposed and enacted after filing the application. These issues
usually arise in one of two contexts. The first occurs whenever a city
proposes a more restrictive building code, e.g., requiring, for the first
apartments have been upheld, see Bebb v. Jordan, 111 Wash. 73, 189 Pac. 553 (1920) ;
Building Comm'n v. Kunin, 181 Mich. 604, 148 N.W. 207 (1914) ; Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 110 Va. 749, 67 S.E. 376 (1910); 54 WAsH. Ar'Y GFN. Op'. 94 (1954)
(approving constitutionality of density use controls).
285 Babcock, Classification and Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954 ILL. LAW
FORUM 186, 193. Subdivision laws have easily been avoided; see, Melli, Subdivision
Control in Wisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 385.
236 See 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTICE 422 (1953).
237 The leading case is, Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165,
89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). See also Haar, Zoning
For Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953),
and McClory, The Undersized House: A Municipal Problem, 27 CmI-KENT L. REv.
142 (1949).
238 Muldoon, The Practical Background of the Zoning and Planning Problems of
the Present and Future, MAss. L. Q., July, 1958, p. 13.
239 "People with large homes sometimes don't want small homes in the same com-
munity. It's snobbery, it's unneighborly and it's anti-democratic." Am. Soc. of Plan-
ning Officials, 16 Newsletter, No. 6 (1950).
240 Babcock, supra note 235 at 201.
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time, that apartment buildings provide space for off-street parking.241
These proposals inevitably result in a rash of applications for permits
to construct buildings conforming to the then existing code, but not to
the proposed changes, and, if allowed, the-effect is a perpetuation and
extension of the very things the legislature has found inimical to the
public interes. 242 A second situation occurs when a municipality
suddenly receives an application for a building permit which would
devote land to a use contrary to the better interests of community
development, but, being unforeseen at the time, the use was not ex-
pressly prohibited by the zoning code. 4 Can the community protect
itself and eliminate these possibly obnoxious uses by a subsequent
change in the zoning code, after a building permit application has been
filed? The basic legal question is whether the application for a building
permit, as opposed to actual construction, should vest rights which
may not be divested on the basis of pending or subsequently enacted
legislation.
All jurisdictions agree that "there is no such thing as an inherent or
vested right to imperil the health or impair the safety of the com-
munity,"2" but they split when answering the specific question relating
to building permits.' A New York 'court has said that "no vested
right is created simply by application for a building permit,) 24 6 and
Pennsylvania allows a municipality to refuse a building permit for a
land use which would be repugnant to a then pending and later enacted
zoning ordinance, although conforming to existing regulations when
made. 4" New Jersey holds that the governing law is that which is
prevailing at the time the court renders its decision and not that pre-
vailing at the time of application. 4 Consequently, a New Jersey city
can both propose and enact zoning changes after applications for
permits have been made and then deny pending applications on the'
basis of the new code."' Unquestionably, the weight of authority indi-
cates that building permits are not per se protected against revocation
241 SEATMLE, WASH., CODE §§ 26.46.030, 26.46.110 (1958).
242 E.g., Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958).
243 E.g., Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wn.2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946).
244 City of Seattle v. Hincldey, 40 Wash. 468, 471, 82 Pac. 747, 748 (1905).
245 Note, 34 No= DAmE LA w. 109 (1958).
246 Haussman v. Oatley, 285 App. Div. 832, 137 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (App. Div. 1955).
247 A. J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586
(1954).24(Rosdle v. Mayor of Moonachie, 48 N.J. Super. 17, 136 A2d 773 (App. Div.
1957) ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Mount Holly Township, 135 N.J.L. 112, 51 A.2d 19
(1947).
249 See Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14
RuTGERs L. REv. 37 (1959).
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by subsequent zoning changes.25
Repulsed by the thought of advancing the cause of retroactive
ordinances, and attracted by the lure of ease in adjudication, Wash-
ington's answer to the question is both simple and clear, and probably
results in speculation in building permits:
Notwithstanding the weight of authority, we prefer to have a date
certain upon which the right vests to construct in accordance with the
building permit. We prefer not to adopt a rule which forces the court
to search through... "the moves and countermoves of... of parties
... by way of passing ordinances and bringing actions for injunctions"
-to which may be added the stalling or acceleration of administrative
action in the issuance of permits-to find that date upon which the sub-
stantial change of position is made which finally vests the right. The
more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that the right vests when
the party, property owner or not, applies for his building permit, if that
permit is thereafter issued. This rule, of course, assumes that the
permit applied for and granted be consistent with the zoning ordinances
and building codes in force at the time of application for the permit.2 51
Court protection for property owners at over-all community expense
is not absolute. If a building permit is issued by mistake, even the
mistake of a city employee, and the building would actually be pro-
hibited by the existing code, then the permit is void. There is no
vested right to construct in these circumstances, and the city may
remove the building. 52 The same result prevails where the permit
authorizes a structure beyond the authority of the issuer to grant, and
is therefore, in violation of law.25 Yet, by eliminating all retroactivity
in having seized on the time of application as controlling, the Wash-
ington court has made paramount the law as it exists at that time, and
consequently, derives the notion that even a presently passed zoning
ordinance can grant no rights simply because it has been passed, but
vests them only on some future date when it becomes effective. 254
The Washington position on building permits is confusing when
seen in its relation to the Washington view on retroactive zoning
measures. Consistently, the court has held to the proposition that a
city, in the exercise of its police power, has the right to enact retro-
spective ordinances affecting existing uses, e.g., compelling a building
250 8 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 357 (3d ed. 1957).
251 Hull v. Hunt, supra note 242 at 130, 331 P.2d at 859; Park v. Stolzheise .supra
note 243; Nolan v. Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 212 Pac. 1048 (1923) ; Coffin v. Black-
well, 116 Wash. 281, 199 Pac. 239 (1921).
252 Nolan v. Blackwell, supra note 251.
253 Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn.2d 402, 341 P.2d 499 (1959).
254 State ex rel. Hardy v. Superior Court, 155 Wash. 244, 284 Pac. 93 (1930).
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owner to make changes which would promote safety or reduce fire
hazards.255 However, it is fundamental that statutes are not to be
construed as retroactive, "unless the retrospective intention is ex-
pressed, or can be plainly gathered from the provisions of the act."25
The court will not imply a retroactive intent lightly.257 Nonetheless,
property is held subject to valid exercises of, the police power, 5 as are
all contracts,.50 and if private rights are restrained by its reasonable
exercise then the results are damnum absque injuria.
Justifiable fears reside in a generalized disapproval of retroactue
zoning laws. 60 They are brought to light when considering the retro-
spective measures in their relation to nonconforming uses. A non-
conforming use of land is one lawfully existing, as distinguished from
one merely being contemplated, 6' on the effective date of the zoning
ordinance, but by virtue of the measure, its continuance is not in
harmony with the zoning provision and it survives in technical viola-
tion of the zoning ordinance.6 2 The burden of proof is on the land
owner to show his right to a nonconforming use, and there is some
evidence indicating that these uses may receive constitutional protec-
tion, unless the resulting loss is inconsequential.65 Although Wash-
ington has no authorizing statutory provision, zoning enabling statutes
of other jurisdictions usually allow for nonconforming uses.6 4 Their
existence is based on the twin assumptions: (1) that nonconforming
uses probably could not be abated except by exercise of the power of
eminent domain, and (2) that they would rapidly disappear after the
enactment of a comprehensive zoning code. 65 Needless to say, the
belief that nonconforming uses would simply fade away has been
255 City of Seattle v. Hincldey, supra note 244, approved in Coffin v. Blackwell,
supra note 251.,
250 City of Seattle v, Hinckley, supra note 244 at 470, 82 Pac. at 748.
257 Compare cases cited supra note 255.
258 E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
255 See City of Seattle v. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424, 97 Pac. 454 (1908).
260 Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Law-
making, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1960) ; Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Consti-
tutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960) ; 1 YoxLEY, 369-
372; Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L. J. 735 (1930).
21 See Town of Wallingford v. Roberts, 145 Conn. 682, 146 A2d 588 (1958);
Martin v. Cestone, 33 N.J. Super. 267, 110 A.2d 54 (1954) ; and Civic Ass'n of Dear-
born Tp. v. Horowitz, 318 Mich. 333, 28 N.W.2d 97 (1947).
262 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954) ; WBsTER,
URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 403-412 (1958), and Anderson,
The Non-Conforming Use-A Product of Euclidian Zoning, 10 SYAcusE L. Rnv. 214
(1959).
2631 Yoiiuy 148 and 369-372.
264 E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. 40:55-48 (1937).
265 Cunningham, supra note 249 at 67.
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shattered on the rock of reality. Ironically enough, this has been
because a comprehensive zoning code often insures their perpetuation.
Zoning measures have freed nonconforming uses from competition
which, if allowed, would further have complicated the land use pat-
tern, and the nonconforming use survives as a local monopoly, e.g.,
residential-district gasoline stations, or grocery or drug stores. Ob-
servers agree that continuing nonconforming uses heighten growing
urban blight, often injure surrounding property values, and help
incapacitate meaningful zoning, but no completely satisfactory solu-
tion has yet been found.266
A land owner might have a right to a nonconforming use in that an
ordinance not allowing them might be held an unconstitutional de-
privation of property without a proportionate offsetting factor to the
public benefit.26 ' However, Washington's view accords with the policy
of the law in all jurisdictions in that it restricts that right severely. "It
was not and is not contemplated that pre-existing nonconforming uses
are to be perpetual." 6 And ordinances prohibiting an enlargement
of a nonconforming use operate prospectively only and are not subject
to the same constitutional infirmity.269 The Washington policy is aptly
illustrated by Coleman v. City of Walla Walla."' A nonconforming
rooming house owner sought permission to convert the structure into
a fraternity house. The court noted that the requested change would
necessitate using the house for board as well as for rooming, for
fraternity social affairs, and might require some structural repairs.
These considerations, in the court's opinion, would amount to an ex-
tension of a nonconforming use, casting the proposed conversion outside
the spirit of zoning laws which seeks to abate nonconforming uses.
Consequently, the court denied the requested change. 1 This com-
mendable judicial aversion to nonconforming uses is evidenced by
another, but more questionable, decision.2"2 A Spokane ordinance
266 See Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958) ; Mandel-
ker, Prolonging the Non-Conforming Use: Judicial Restriction of the Power to Zone
in Iowa, 8 DRAKE L. RFv. 23 (1958); Anderson, Amortization of Non-Conforning
Uses, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44 (1958) ; Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and
Structures, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 305 (1955), and Gallagher, Report of Com-
mittee on Zoning and Planning, 18 NIMLO 372 (1955).
267 A leading case is State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wn.2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952).
268 Id. at 220, 242 P.2d at 508.
269 Ibid. See Wallace, Legal Considerations Incident to Zoning in Bd. of Gov. Res.
& Services, U. of W., Info. Bull. No. 164, at 7 (1954).
270 44 Wn.2d 296, 266 P.2d 1034 (1954).
271 "This is necessarily implied by a zoning plan comprehensive in character." Id.
at 300, 266 P.2d at 1036. But cf. State ex rel. Modern Lumber & Millwork Co. v.
MacDuff, supra note 224.
272 Shields v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 31 Wn.2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948).
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authorized enlargements of nonconforming uses upon any tract held
in single ownership.27 The school district sought permission to con-
vert a nonconforming elementary school located in a residential district
into a trade school having "shops, machinery, noise and fumes." The
court held that the requested conversion would be such an abrupt
change from its use as an elementary school that it could not be con-
sidered an "enlargement" of a pre-existing, use, and hence, could not
be permitted.'
In addition, many ordinances declare that disuse or abandonment
of a nonconforming use will terminate it. There has been no Washing-
ton case squarely upholding these measures; however, it is known
that a clear intent of abandonment is necessary before the court will
abate the use."' A nonconforming building devoted~to a nonconform-
ing use cannot be replaced by a new structure even though it would be
devoted to exactly the same nonconforming use." 6 And in Manos v.
City of Seattle,"' the court indicated that granting the right to use a
building as a skating rink did not entitle the owner to use it as a dance
hall contrary to ordinance, even though the building was originally
constructed as a dance hall."' Further, the fire ordinance cases estab-
lished the proposition that so long as standards apply equally to all
uses, the repair of buildings damaged by fire or other catastrophe can
be prohibited.27 '
Despite Washington's salutary doctrinal development restricting
nonconforming uses, it has become axiomatic.that old uses never die,
nor do they fade away. Given the cost involved, it is unreal to expect
condemnation to be very effective. The thought is growing that if
278id. at 255, 196 P.2d at 357. This ordinance responded to the court's holding in
State ex rel. Modern Millwork & Lumber Co. v. MacDuff, supra note-244.
274 Ibid. This case should be compared carefully to Liberty Lumber Co. v. City of
Tacoma, 142 Wash. 377, 253 Pac. 122 (1927) holding that two additional lots pur-
chased for lumbershed purposes, adjoining six city lots in a residential district already
used for a lumber business did not amount to an "enlargement" of a non-conforming
business. But note the later and stricter interpretation of King County v. Lunn, 32
Wn.2d 116, 220 P2d 981 (1948).
275 See King County v. High, 36 W2d 580, 219 P.2d 118 (1950).
276 State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, supra note 267 (Plaintiff sought to substitute a steel
and concrete gasoline service station for a wooden one). This is the prevailing view,
Annot., 147 A.L.R. 176 (1943). Contra is Board of Adj. v. Perlmutter, 131 Colo. 230,
280 P.2d 1107 (1955), approving a change of both buildings and uses from brick manu-
facture to a shopping center on the theory that the resulting non-conforming use would
be more restrictive. Clearly, the non-conforming use is thereby further perpetuated
contra to the general plan.
277 146 Wash. 210, 262 Pac. 965 (1927).
278 Ibid. The building was constructed as a dancehall in 1919, then used as a box
factory until 1924, and until 1927, the time of application, it was used as a skating rink.
270 Behrend v. Town of Pe Ell, 136 Wash. 364, 240 Pac. 12 (1925), and see, RCW
35.80 (abating "unfit" dwellings and structures).
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these obstructive uses are to be eliminated at all, then summary
termination measures are called for, i.e., retroactivity. The legal doc-
trines have long been prepared. Before comprehensive planning got
off the ground the United States Supreme Court held that an ordinance
prohibiting stables in a business area and further requiring their
immediate abatement did not take property without due process of
law."' It also upheld a Los Angeles ordinance outlawing brick manu-
facture within city limits, even though its application caused substantial
loss to the owner whose brick kiln had just been annexed."' Seeing
this green light, municipalities have been adopting ordinances which
require cessation of nonconforming uses after lapse of some given
period of time. 2 The period of time allowed varies, and the idea is
to grant the user time sufficient to amortize his investment costs before
terminating the use. Consequently, the period of grace should bear
some reasonable relation to the user's investment, else an unfair burden
would result. These amortization ordinances are successful, and gen-
erally, they have received judicial approval. 8 City of Seattle v.
Martin28 indicates that the Washington court has not been niggardly
in this regard.
That case was one of first impression, and the court sustained an
ordinance provision whose effect was to terminate the use of a vacant
lot, held on a month-to-month tenancy, for machinery repair work
within one year after the date of a zoning classification change that
rendered the use nonconforming. The basic question was whether the
one-year termination restriction as applied to the lessee was a reason-
able exercise of the police power. The court balanced the burden of
hardship on the lessee against the public benefit to be derived from
terminating the use, and upheld the measure, saying:
The lot is vacant and is rented on a month-to-month basis. Appellant
is not being required to tear down a building or to liquidate a large
business. As noted heretofore, the ordinance allowed appellant a period
of one year to effect the necessary changes in the operation of his
business. In that time it would not have been too difficult for him to
have made other reasonably satisfactory arrangements for the repair
250 Reimman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) ; City of Seattle v. Hinckley, supra
note 244.
281 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
282 See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.10.030 (1958) ; see also Comment, Elimination
of Non-Conforming Uses, 35 VA. L. REV. 348 (1949), and Comment, Elimination of
Non-Conforming Uses, 1951 Wis. L. REV. 685.
283 Note, 35 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1960) (collecting cases).
284 54 Wn.2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
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of his equipment in a more appropriate area.285
The building permit and retrospective zoning cases pose special
problems for interim ordinances in Washington. An interim ordinance
is one effective between the time the planning process begins and the
enactment of a comprehensive zoning code based on such a plan. Its
aim is to secure the then existing land use pattern until the compre-
hensive plan is translated into law. It is not in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, for none exists. Often communities bask in apathy
and awaken to consider planning and zoning only when threatened
with a noxious land use.28' Legislative processes are often slow, and
comprehensive plans resting on proper public notice and hearings
cannot be made in a day. But communities strictly must follow
enabling legislation,"T and if modern zoning measures do not rest on
a comprehensive plan, they probably will be deemed unreasonable.288
These considerations are sound; yet, it appears equally sound that
Washington cities should be able to protect themselves from objection-
able land uses. Interim ordinances might be the solution, if the Wash-
ington court were to approve them.289 If not, they should be authorized
by statute.8 ° Interim ordinances provide no more than fleeting solu-
tions at best, and they should be authorized to run only for a specified
time, after which, they would automatically become invalid unless
reenacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
TnE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
There is another set of cases separate and distinct from those con-
sidered above. They originate with the Board of Adjustment,"1 and
the prime distinction here is the difference between dealing with legisla-
tive enactments, on the one hand, and administrative decisions on the
other. The Board's prime function is to provide flexibility, relaxing
zoning restrictions in appropriate cases. 292 The Washington legislature
2 85 Id. at 544-45, 342 P.2d at 604.2 86 Another reason is business rejection of a city because uncomplicated production
appears impossible. Cities seek to remedy this situation quickly; see Am. Soc'y of
Planning Officials, Does Industry Pass Up Your Town?, 22 Newsletter 21 (1956).2 8 7Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949), but cf. A. J.
Aberman Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A2d 586 (1954).
288 See RCW 35.63.090, and Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68
Hjav. L. REv. 1154 (1955).
289 California courts allowed them early; Miller v. Los Angeles, 195 Cal. 477, 234
Pac. 381 (1925).
200 This has been done for counties; RCW 36.70.790.
291 Webster, op.cit. supra, note 262 at 423-437; Jennings & Campbell, The Board of
Adjustment, B. oF Gov. Rxs. & SaviCms, U. oF W., Report No. 124 (1953).
282 Sumner, The Board of Adjustment as a Corrective in Zoning Practice, 13 NATL
Mu r. Rxv. 203 (1924).
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has met this need, authorizing cities.. and counties.94 to create Boards
of Adjustment. These boards are to the zoning system what a safety
valve is to a boiler system, but they can function as leaks too. Where
they have not been provided for by statute, courts have required cities
adopting zoning provisions to furnish the machinery to carry out the
spirit and intent of the law under which they create comprehensive
zoning codes.295
The Washington statute authorizing county Boards of Adjustment
is comprehensive in scope, outlining, inter alia, such things as jurisdic-
tional powers, notice, hearing and appeals. But municipalities are
empowered only in a most general way to authorize their boards to
grant "special exceptions" in harmony with the general spirit of land-
use planning.29 Construing the term "special exception," Seattle, in
conformity with the traditional pattern, has authorized its board to
pass on applications for "special property uses" and "variances.9
The distinction between these two terms is subtle but fundamental."'
A special property use is an "exception" which can be granted by the
board only where the facts presented in the application are in accord
with the very detailed conditions set forth and found in the ordinance."'
Here, standards are involved to guide the board, and there need be no
showing of unnecessary hardship. Examples are temporary noncon-
forming uses or unusual commercial uses, e.g., television stations which
require exceptional height limits. A variance,"° on the other hand,
permits a nonconforming use not contrary to the public interest, but
one which would otherwise be prohibited by a strict application of the
zoning code. Variances are granted to relieve individual hardship, and
will issue only after a showing that the literal interpretation and
strict application of the zoning provisions would cause undue and
unnecessary hardships.3"' Aside from the power to grant special
293 RCW 35.63.080.
294 RCW 36.70.810--.900.
295 1 RATHKOPF 599; 1 YOKLEY 121.
296 RCW 35.63.080.
297 SEATTLE, WASH., CODE §§ 26.50.040 (1958). See also Campbell & Jennings,
op.cit. supra, note 291 at 5.
298 For discussion, see dissenting opinion in Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d
385 (1952), affirmed, 16 N.J. 16, 105 A.2d 851 (1954), and 1 YOKLEY 323.
299 See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.50.050 (1958).
300 Defined for counties in RCW 36.70.030(14) ; see also Reps, Discretionary Pow-
ers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 280 (1955), and
Green, The Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances From the
Zoning Ordinance, 29 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1951).3o See RCW 36.70.810 (2) ; SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.50.060 (1958) ; Application
of Devereux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S.
686 (1945), and Note, The Unnecessary Hardship Rule, 8 SYRAcusE L. REv. 85 (1957).
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property uses and variances, a board of adjustment generally has
power to review alleged errors in decisions made by building inspectors
when denying permits. Both special property uses and variances,
although nonconforming, should be distinguished from general non-
conforming uses discussed supra which existed prior to the adoption
of a zoning code. Also, it should be obvious that with the possible
exception of "spot zoning," nothing can cause a more general break-
down of a zoning system than an indiscriminate practice of granting
variances."'
The legislature has provided that actions by county Boards of Ad-
justment are final unless court appeal is taken within ten days by writ
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. 3 Though uncommon, deci-
sions of municipal boards can first be subjected, by ordinance, to
review by their city councils. °4 These municipal appeals procedures -
probably must be followed since Boards of Adjustment are adminis-
trative agencies, and the doctrine requiring the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies would operate."' However, when reviewing a board's
actions, a council acts in a quasi-judicial role and is bound by the
board's findings. It cannot constitutionally subject a property owner
to the type of policy considerations which it would usually consider
while legislating.00 Although the state legislature has not provided
statutory authority for further appeals from municipal board actions,
there is no doubt that subsequent court review can be obtained by
certiorari, where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at
law.07 If the appeal is allowed, Washington trial courts act "as a court
30 2 See A.S.P.O., Measure of Variance Activity, Planning Advisory Info. Rep. No.
60 (1954) ; Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variations and Neighborhood Decline
in Illinois, 48 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 470 (1953); Administration of Zoning Variances in
Twenty Cities, 30 Pub. Management 70 (1948).
303 RCW 36.70.890.
304 SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 26.50.100 (1958). This is not a desirable practice from
a zoning point of view and might be unconstitutional. "The acts of administering a
zoning ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy and discretion which were
settled at the time of adoption of the ordinance.... To subject individuals to questions
of policy in administrative matters would be unconstitutional." State ex rel. Ogden v.
City of Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 495, 275 P.2d 899, 902 (1954). Apparently councilmen
do this because they believe court processes would be "a great financial burden on
persons of modest means." The Seattle Times, p. 47, Col. 8, September 7, 1960.
805 See Fox, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Zoning Disputes, 50 CHI.
BARx Rzcoan 119 (1959), and Peck, The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative
Action in Washington, 33 WASH L. REv. 55 (1958).
30 See supra note 304.
807 See State ex rel. Lyon v. Board of County Comm'r, 31 Wn.2d 366, 372, 196 P.2d
997, 1000 (1948); consult further, RCW 2.08.010 (original jurisdiction of superior
co,.rts and power to issue writs), RCW 2.08.020 (appellate jurisdiction of superior
court), RCW 7.16.030 (certiorari equals writ of review, generally), RCW 7.16.040
(grounds for issuing writ of review). A writ of review will not issue to review legis-
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of review for error of law and [can] not try the case de novo......
Consequently, the record made before the board in the first instance
becomes all important. Further, the reviewing court cannot disturb
the board's decision unless it either applied erroneous principles of
law, °9 or plainly abused its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.31 However, "the ultimate burden of proof relative to alleged
arbitrary and capricious zoning action rests upon the zoning authori-
ties and not upon a property owner who is seeking a permit..31
The court's position here might possibly prove unfortunate from a
planning point of view, but it spells a lesser burden for an aggrieved
land owner. If he can start his case in the Board of Adjustment, and
then by certiorari take advantage of his ready access to the courts,
he need not bother himself with the usual presumptions and obstacles
favoring the validity of an ordinance which would probably plague
him had he chosen to sue to enjoin the actions of the governing body.
Also, when he appeals to the Board of Adjustment from a denial of a
building permit, should the meaning of the ordinance be obscure, he
has the argument that, properly construed, his contemplated use is
permissible under the measure. If allowed, these arguments conceiv-
ably could produce results antithetical to community planning and
zoning. But they can be averted if the court were to resurrect the
rule that: public officers are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly, and the burden of establishing arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion rests upon the one who asserts it. 12 Perhaps this was the mean-
ing underlying the court's action when it italicized the word "ultimate."
CONCLUSION
In this article I have sought neither to be exhaustive nor definitive
in the matters treated, but rather, my attempt here has been to adum-
brate considerations relevant to an outline of more effective municipal
zoning in Washington. Remaining questions are in abundance.313 Per-
lative acts, but only judicial acts, see State ex rel. New Washington Oyster Co. v.
Meakim, 34 Wn.2d 131, 208 P.2d 628 (1949), and Tenny v. Seattle Electric Co., 48
Wash. 150, 92 Pac. 895 (1907).
308 State ex tel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wen-
atchee, supra note 216 at 383, 312 p. 2nd at 197.
309 Ibid.
310 State ex el. Ogden v. Bellevue, supra note 304.
311 State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wen-
atchee, supra note 216 at 383, 312 P.2d at 198.
312 Id. at 389, 312 P.2d at 201 (dissenting opinion) and cases cited.
313 Energing Legal Issues in Zoning, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL PLANNING
CONFERENCE (1954), and Blucher, Is Zoning Wagging the Dogf PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL PLANNING CONFERENCE (1955).
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haps solutions to more minuscule inquiries will form stepping stones
and provide clues which will fathom the legal implications of the vast
problem posed at the beginning of this paper. Current and long-lasting
problems facing our polity stem, in the main, from rapid expansions
of technological knowledge, increased rapidity of communication and
transportation, and more massive numbers of people living closer to-
gether, yet possessing increasing mobility. If we are to elucidate solu-
tions, then surely, lawyers must be brought into a fresh and vivified
relationship with the wellsprings of creative thought. The necessary
legal craftsmanship must assiduously be galvanized, producing novel
revelations, rather than restating desultory cliches. The law's path-
way in the future is no small endeavor. But social destiny is self-
compelled, and we must flagellate our collective legal imagination if
we are to accept gracefully the bounty which our future world affords.
